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When the Bezzle Bursts:  Restitutionary 
Distribution of Assets After Ponzi 
Schemes Enter Bankruptcy 
Mallory A. Sullivan∗ 
To the economist embezzlement is the most interesting of crimes.  
Alone among the various forms of larceny it has a time parameter.  
Weeks, months, or years may elapse between the commission of the 
crime and its discovery.  (This is a period, incidentally, when the 
embezzler has his gain and the man who has been embezzled, oddly 
enough, feels no loss.  There is a net increase in psychic wealth.)  At any 
given time there exists an inventory of undiscovered embezzlement in—
or more precisely not in—the country’s business and banks.  This 
inventory—it should perhaps be called the bezzle—amounts at any 
moment to many millions of dollars. It also varies in size with the 
business cycle.  In good times people are . . . trusting [] and money is 
plentiful[, b]ut . . . there are always many people who need more. Under 
these circumstances the rate of embezzlement grows, the rate of 
discovery falls off, and the bezzle increases rapidly.  In depression all 
this is reversed. . . .  Commercial morality is enormously improved.  The 
bezzle shrinks. . . .  Just as the boom accelerate[s] the rate of growth, so 
the crash enormously advance[s] the rate of discovery. . . .  One of the 
uses of depression is the exposure of what auditors fail to find.  Bagehot 
once observed: "Every great crisis reveals the excessive speculations of 
many houses which no one before suspected." 
—John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash.1 
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I.  Introduction 
Surprising to all, but perhaps those familiar with Galbraith’s critique 
of the 1929 stock market crash, the 2008 banking crisis revealed prolific 
investment fraud.  Among those exposed was "a former chairman of the 
NASDAQ Stock Market and a force in Wall Street trading for nearly 50 
years," Bernard L. "Bernie" Madoff, who was thought to have a sterling 
reputation.2  In today’s market, financial fraud is increasingly 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See Amir Efrati, Tom Lauricella & Dionne Searcey, Top Broker Accused of $50 
Billion Fraud, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122903010173099377.html (noting that prior to his arrest, 
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prevalent,3 and just as Galbraith foreshadowed, fraudulent financial 
schemes are collapsing more frequently given the current economy.4  Ponzi 
schemes5 are no exception.  According to the Associated Press, the number 
of Ponzi schemes uncovered nearly quadrupled from 2008 to 2009 alone.6  
Though the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) denies that there 
has been a "dramatic upswing in terms of the number of [Ponzi scheme] 
cases,"7 the agency’s deputy director of public affairs, John Heine, admits 
that the SEC does not keep official statistics on Ponzi schemes.8  Instead, 
                                                                                                                 
Madoff was a "longstanding leader in the financial-services industry with an unblemished 
record"). 
 3. See Page Perry LLC, Financial Scams Are Becoming More Common as the 
Economy Deteriorates, INVESTMENT FRAUD LEGAL BLOG (Apr. 13, 2009), http://www. 
investmentfraudlawyerblog.com/2009/04/financial_scams_are_becoming_m.html (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2011) ("The Federal Bureau of Investigation reported that corporate fraud more than 
doubled from 279 cases in 2003 to 529 in 2007 . . . .  The financial frauds include various 
forms of theft, such as Ponzi Schemes and embezzlement.") (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 4. See id. ("The down market ‘exposes more of those frauds’ . . . ."); David A. 
Gradwohl & Karin Corbett, Equity Receiverships for Ponzi Schemes, 34 SETON HALL LEGIS. 
J. 181, 189 (2010) ("With Madoff, the engine of fraud churned on until the collapse of the 
securities markets caused new investors to stop feeding the scheme and made it impossible 
for Madoff to continue."). 
 5. Gradwohl & Corbett, supra note 4, at 183–84 ("The term ‘Ponzi scheme’ has 
achieved an established position of instant recognition in American jurisprudence and a 
certain degree of infamy in everyday English parlance.").  The term "Ponzi scheme" is 
derived from Charles Ponzi, the operator of a fraudulent investment program, which 
collapsed in the 1920s.  See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1924) (discussing the 
collapse of Ponzi’s fraudulent investment program).  In the legal context, a Ponzi scheme is 
defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as "[a] fraudulent investment scheme in which money 
contributed by later investors generates artificially high dividends or returns for the original 
investors, whose example attracts even larger investments.  Money from the new investors is 
used directly to repay or pay interest to earlier investors . . . ."  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(9th ed. 2009). 
 6. See Gary D. Halbert, Record Year For Ponzi Schemes, INVESTOR INSIGHT (Jan. 19, 
2010), http://www.investorsinsight.com/blogs/forecasts_trends/archive/2010/01/19/record-
year-for-ponzi-schemes.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2011)  ("According to recent research by 
the Associated Press (AP) . . . more than 150 Ponzi and other fraudulent investment schemes 
were exposed in 2009, compared to only 40 or so such scams uncovered in 2008.") (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 7. U.S. SEC Says Magnitude of Ponzi Schemes Growing, DALJE.COM (Feb. 6, 2009, 
6:10 PM), http://dalje.com/en-economy/us-sec-says-magnitude-of-ponzi-schemes-growing/ 
231770 (last visited Aug. 8, 2011) (quoting a speech by Donald Hoerl, director of the SEC’s 
Denver office, given at Practising Law Institute’s annual SEC Speaks conference) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 8. See Robert Chew, Beyond Madoff, Ponzi Schemes Proliferate, TIME MAG. (Jan. 
23, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1873639,00.html (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2011) (explaining that official statistics are not kept because "[t]here are too many 
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what SEC officials have observed as different is "the magnitude of the 
Ponzi schemes" being perpetrated.9  While Madoff is certainly the most 
notorious of the Ponzi scheme operators,10 other high dollar operations have 
been discovered in his wake.11  Given the proliferation and growing 
magnitude of Ponzi schemes, it is important that possible avenues of 
investor recovery be examined. 
This Note first examines the increasing prevalence of financial fraud 
and the proliferation of Ponzi schemes.  Part II outlines the possible ways 
that investors can recover when investments are lost in a Ponzi scheme:  
SIPC coverage, restitution from the wrongdoer, or through tracing and 
restitution from unjustly enriched third parties.  Part II also explains that 
recovery is uncertain due to the limited protection offered by the SIPC, the 
likely inadequacy of any financial recovery from the erring fiduciary, and 
the lack of coherently-developed tracing and restitutionary law.  Part III 
further expounds upon tracing, a tool utilized to identify assets that can be 
claimed by the creditors (former investors) of the erring fiduciary.  It then 
analyzes the utilization of tracing fictions and the necessity of suspending 
tracing in favor of pro rata distribution when commingled funds render 
individual tracing impossible.  Part IV details the avoidance powers of the 
bankruptcy trustee through fraudulent transfers, both actual and 
constructive, and through preferential transfers.  Part V contemplates the 
                                                                                                                 
variations . . . [i]t’s hard to categorize a Ponzi vs. a pyramid scheme vs. something else") (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 9. U.S. SEC Says Magnitude of Ponzi Schemes Growing, supra note 7. 
 10. See Gradwohl & Corbett, supra note 4, at 188 ("While the Ponzi scheme 
engineered by Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC may end up being the largest 
fraud in terms of dollars lost, it is not unique."); see also Danny King, JPMorgan Faces 
Lawsuit over Madoff Fraud, DAILY FIN. (Dec. 2, 2010, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/investing/jpmorgan-faces-lawsuit-over-madoff-
fraud/19742389/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2011) (noting that Madoff’s $65 billion dollar fraud 
was the largest Ponzi scheme in U.S. history) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 11. In February 2009, the SEC charged Robert Allen Stanford with running an $8 
billion fraudulent investment scheme.  See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Press 
Release:  SEC Charges R. Allen Stanford, Stanford International Bank for Multi-Billion 
Dollar Investment Scheme (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-
26.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2011) (detailing the charges against "Stanford and three of his 
companies," which centered around his operation of an "$8 billion [fraudulent] CD 
program") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Leslie Wayne, 
Troubled Times Bring Mini-Madoffs to Light, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/28/business/28ponzi.html (noting, among other Ponzi 
schemes uncovered in 2009, a $380 million Ponzi scheme run by Nicholas Cosmo, a $23 
million scheme run by George L. Theodule, and a $25 million scheme operated by James G. 
Ossie). 
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shortcomings of the current statutory scheme of fraudulent and preferential 
transfers.  It considers how courts have misapplied the fraudulent transfers 
statute as written by abrogating the good faith defense and how the 
preferential transfer statute simply reallocates where an arbitrary line 
regarding the ability to recover is drawn.  Part V also looks at the discretion 
given to the trustee and the resulting inequity and increased uncertainty in 
the law.   
Last, Part VI gives an overview of possible ways to promote 
predictability in the law.  It examines proposed legislation limiting 
clawbacks and extending SIPC protection, the ability of Congress to amend 
the fraudulent or preferential transfer statutes, and the introduction of 
contractual clawback provisions into investment agreements.  Part VI then 
suggests an amalgam of the current proposals, in addition to other actions, 
as a practicable solution.  By allowing pro rata distribution only when 
tracing is unworkable, traditional property and restitution rules will be 
observed.  By affirming a subjective good faith standard, and introducing 
"change of position" as an affirmative defense from clawbacks, the 
reachback period can be statutorily extended back to the inception of the 
Ponzi scheme while still protecting good faith investors.  The introduction 
of pecuniary protection for whistleblowers promotes investor diligence and 
makes frauds more likely to be caught in the earlier stages.  These changes 
will promote predictability in the distribution of assets after Ponzi schemes 
enter bankruptcy while effectuating a more equitable distribution between 
all investors, promoting the underlying equal-treatment goal of the 
Bankruptcy Code, and upholding traditional restitutionary principles. 
II.  Avenues of Investor Recovery After Ponzi Schemes Enter Bankruptcy 
A.  SIPC Coverage 
Ponzi schemes are rarely perpetrated by "legitimate" brokers, but in 
Madoff’s case, he was a licensed broker, and his brokerage firm was a 
member of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC).12  The 
SIPC touts itself as "the investor’s first line of defense in the event a 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See Jerry J. Campos, Avoiding the Discretionary Function Rule in the Madoff 
Case, 55 LOY. L. REV. 587, 591–92 (2009) (noting that Madoff’s firm, Bernard L. Madoff 
Investment Securities LLC, "was a broker-dealer and investment advisor firm registered 
under the SEC which conducted investment advising services, market making services, and 
proprietary trading services"). 
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brokerage firm fails owing customers cash and securities that are missing 
from customer accounts," and investors assumed that the SIPC would step 
in to cover part of their stolen funds.13 
Through the Securities Investor Protection Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-
lll),14 Congress created SIPC in 197015 as a "response to the financial crisis 
in the securities industry in the late 1960s."16  The SIPC purports "to protect 
customers of broker-dealers and maintain confidence in the United States 
securities markets."17  It does not account for losses due to market 
fluctuations or the decline in value of securities.18  Instead, its purpose is to 
"insure brokerage firms just as the FDIC ensures bank accounts, but . . . 
only against theft or misappropriation," bringing Madoff’s behavior exactly 
within the confines of the SIPC’s intended purpose.19  The legislative 
history of the Act and its subsequent amendments clarify that investors 
were intended to be protected, even if the securities were "hypothecated, 
misappropriated, never purchased, or even stolen . . . ."20 
However, the SIPC does not cover all types of investments,21 nor does 
it cover victims who invested indirectly through a feeder fund as they fail to 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, Our 39-Year Track Record for 
Investors, http://www.sipc.org/who/sipctrackrecord.cfm (last visited Aug. 8, 2011) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  The SIPC provides $500,000 in protection per 
investor, which includes a $250,000 maximum allowance for cash claims.  See Securities 
Investor Protection Corporation, Brochure, http://www.sipc.org/how/brochure.cfm (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2011) (outlining the protection provided to customers) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 14. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, SIPC Statute and Rules, 
http://www.sipc.org/who/statute.cfm (last visited Aug. 8, 2011) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 15. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, The SIPC Mission, 
http://www.sipc.org/who/sipcmission.cfm (last visited Aug. 8, 2011) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 16. WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., 4 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3D § 87:9 (2011). 
 17. See Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. BDO Seidman, L.L.P., 746 N.E.2d 1042, 1045 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the SIPC did not have a valid cause of action for 
negligent misrepresentation against accounting firm BDO Seidman because the SIPC was a 
non-privy third party). 
 18. All Things Considered:  SIPC May Rescue Madoff Victims, NPR, Dec. 31, 2008, 
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98913273 (explaining 
that the SIPC does not "cover market risk or the simple decline of the value of securities").   
 19. Id. 
 20. S. REP. NO. 95-763, at 2 (1978); H.R. REP. NO. 95-746, at 21 (1978). 
 21. See Securities Investor Protection Corporation, What SIPC Covers . . . What it 
Does Not, http://www.sipc.org/how/covers.cfm (last visited Aug. 8, 2011) (noting that the 
SIPC does not cover currencies, commodity futures contracts, investment contracts, or fixed 
annuity contracts that have not been registered with the SEC) (on file with the Washington 
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meet the definition of "customer" in section 78lll(2) of SIPA.22  Many of 
Madoff’s victims do not qualify for reimbursement from the SIPC due to 
regulatory restrictions, particularly the third party limitation.23  Even those 
investors whose claims are accepted may only recover up to the modest 
statutory limit, and only after agreeing to substantial conditions.24 
The SIPC was severely underfunded to cover the losses resulting from 
Madoff’s scheme25 and has limited claims to the amount actually invested, 
not the amount shown on the victim’s most recent statement.26  This 
approach, "referred to as the ‘net principal’ theory or the ‘equity theory,’ 
espouses the idea that the measure of bankruptcy claims should be a matter 
of equity where illegal contracts or massive fraud [are] involved."27  
                                                                                                                 
and Lee Law Review).  While individuals who invest in these exchanges certainly do not 
expect their investments to fuel a Ponzi operation, such investors did not rely on SIPC 
coverage and presumably were aware of and accepted the higher-risk nature of their 
investment. 
 22. Trustee’s Fourth Interim Report for the Period Ending September 30, 2010, at 8, 
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Madoff (In re Madoff), Adv. Pro. No. 08-1789 (BRL) 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), available at http://www.madofftrustee.com/documents/FourthInterim 
Report.pdf.  
 23. See Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC Liquidation Proceeding, Claims 
& Recovery Status (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.madofftrustee.com/Status.aspx (last visited 
Aug. 9, 2011) (noting that as of August 5, 2011, only 14.64% of claims had been approved 
and 66.45% were denied as third party claims) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 24. See Campos, supra note 12, at 602 (noting that investors "are capped in what they 
can receive from the organization and face a labyrinth of conditions and strictures on 
actually getting money from the organization"). 
 25. See Rachelle Younglai, Madoff Victims Seek Help from Congress, REUTERS (Dec. 
9, 2009, 6:07 PM) http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0912808120091209 (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2011) ("SIPC is underfunded and has never had to deal with a liquidation the size of 
Madoff’s brokerage.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Fourth 
Interim Report, supra note 22, at 11: 
As of September 30, 2010, the Trustee . . . committed to pay approximately 
$728 million in cash advances from SIPC.  This is the largest commitment of 
SIPC funds in any one SIPA liquidation proceeding and greatly exceeds the total 
aggregate payments made in all SIPA liquidations to date. . . .  The total over-
the-limits claim amount—the amount by which allowed customer claims exceed 
the committed SIPC advances—is $4.9 billion. 
Id. 
 26. See Younglai, supra note 25 (noting that the SIPC, SEC, and bankruptcy trustee all 
agree that "customer claims should be based on how much money the victim invested, not 
the amount the victim thought he had made from Madoff’s fictitious investments"). 
 27. John Clemency & Scott Goldberg, Ponzi Schemes and Claims Allowance, 19-9 
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14, 14 (2000).  On March 1, 2010, the bankruptcy court handling 
Madoff’s liquidation adopted the Trustee’s determination that customer claims be calculated 
using the "equity theory."  In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 424 B.R. 122, 141, 143 
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However, prior to Madoff, the SIPC took the position that the appreciated 
value of the investment was protected.  The "reasonable and legitimate 
claimant expectations on the filing date are controlling even where 
inconsistent with transactional reality."28  The president of the SIPC, Steven 
Harbeck, testified at a trial "that SIPC covers appreciation in customer 
accounts . . . ‘even if the securities were never purchased.’"29  This change in 
approach is particularly troublesome because a primary benefit of investing 
with an SIPC certified broker is to be insured against malfeasance.30  The 
SIPC-certified broker is also subject to regulation by the SEC, which should 
prevent, and at a minimum catch, fraudulent schemes early.31  The SEC failed 
investors on both counts, due to its underfunding and inability to cover losses, 
as well as its failure to follow up on Madoff, despite receiving multiple 
credible tips that his business venture was not legitimate.32  Consequently, 
even investors who believed that they acted prudently by investing with a 
licensed brokerage firm are minimally, if any, better off than those who 
invest in programs outside of SIPC protection and SEC regulation. 
Because the SIPC, the supposed "first line of defense," has failed to 
make investors whole,33 defrauded victims have turned to restitutionary 
remedies.  Though restitution scholarship has, at least arguably, "been out of 
fashion for nearly one hundred years,"34 its ability to adapt to contemporary 
                                                                                                                 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, 09-5122-bk, 2011 WL 3568936 (2d Cir. Aug. 16, 2011) 
("[E]quity dictates that the Court implement the Net Investment Method.").  The bankruptcy 
court certified an immediate appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  In re Bernard L. 
Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 09-5122-bk, 2011 WL 3568936, at *4 (2d Cir. 2011).  On August 16, 
2011, the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court and upheld the 
Trustee’s method of determining customer claims in the context of a Ponzi scheme.  Id. at *8 
("The extraordinary facts of this case make the Net Investment Method appropriate, whereas 
in many instances, it would not be."). 
 28. Paul Sinclair & Brendan McPherson, The Sad Tale of Multiple Overlapping 
Fraudulent Transfers:  Part IV, 29-4 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 69 (2010) (citations omitted).   
 29. Id. at 69 (quoting Hearing Transcript at 37–38, In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 
371 F.3d 68 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2000)). 
 30. See Younglai, supra note 25 ("‘We have a mess on our hands. We have a large 
group of American investors who were robbed by Madoff, abused by the government and 
system into thinking they were insured,’ said Democratic Representative Gary Ackerman."). 
 31. See Campos, supra note 12, at 604 ("[T]he SEC is concerned with providing 
investors important market-related information, maintaining fair dealing among the players, 
and most importantly protecting against fraud." (emphasis added)). 
 32. See infra notes 188–91 and accompanying text (discussing the inconsistencies 
reported to the SEC and the agency’s failure to investigate). 
 33. Campos, supra note 12, at 602 ("[R]estrictions on the SIPC fund’s disbursements 
and the reality of large Ponzi schemes often dictate an insufficient recovery."). 
 34. Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution:  A Case of Contemporary Common Law 
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needs35 has placed restitutionary law at the forefront of recovering the 
misappropriated funds that are making today’s headline news.36 
B.  Restitution from the Erring Fiduciary 
Although the remedy of rescission37 is typically available in instances of 
fraud,38 this does not hold true in the context of a bankrupt Ponzi scheme.39  
                                                                                                                 
Conceptualism, 52 VILL. L. REV. 487, 528 (2007). 
 35. See Doug Rendleman, When Is Enrichment Unjust?  Restitution Visits an Onyx 
Bathroom, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 991, 1001 (2003) ("[C]ourts use common law techniques to 
decide unprovided-for disputes and shape restitution doctrines to contemporary needs . . . ."). 
 36. See Mark T. Cramer & R. Alexander Pilmer, Swindlers’ List:  Formal Dissolution 
Proceedings Are Usually Necessary to Sort Through the Wreckage of Failed Ponzi Schemes, 
32 L.A. LAW., June 2009, at 22 ("Thanks to Madoff, Ponzi schemes are now part of the 
mainstream lexicon and are no longer solely the obscure subjects of court opinions and law 
review articles.  Indeed, talk of Ponzi schemes seems to dominate not only the headlines but 
also late-night talk shows . . . ."). 
 37. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining rescission as "[a] party’s 
unilateral unmaking of a contract for a legally sufficient reason").   
 38. See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Support of Persons § 35 (2010) ("[C]ancellation is not 
available unless there are special circumstances affecting the adequacy of other remedies, 
such as fraud or insolvency on the part of the grantee rendering cancellation the appropriate 
relief.").  However, "[t]he remedy of cancellation . . . [or] rescission . . . is not one of 
absolute right and it is subject to the court’s sound discretion . . . to be exercised in 
accordance with what is reasonable and just under the particular circumstances."  Id.  
 39. See Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy:  Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 
72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 265, 285–86 (1998) (explaining why rescission is not an appropriate 
remedy when a creditor is defrauded in a Ponzi scheme).  Consider the following scenario by 
Andrew Kull: 
Peter and Paul have both been victims of [an investment scheme] fraud. Because 
he remitted funds to Ponzi just before the swindle was exposed, Peter is able to 
trace his money into Ponzi’s bank account; Paul’s funds were remitted earlier 
and are untraceable.  Ponzi is now in bankruptcy and Peter wants restitution of 
the traceable funds from the bankrupt estate.  He offers the usual argument about 
second-order restitution:  Ponzi’s trustee should not be distributing Peter’s 
property (the traceable portion of Peter’s investment, Peter having rescinded the 
transfer for fraud) to pay Ponzi’s creditors.  But Ponzi’s creditors are defrauded 
investors just like Peter.  Because Peter cannot properly differentiate his claim 
against Ponzi from that of the other creditors, his claim to priority fails. . . .  [I]n 
the Ponzi scenario, neither Peter nor Paul has voluntarily extended credit to the 
debtor.  Both were defrauded; each asserts a right to rescind.  Instead of a 
problem in second-order restitution between a dispossessed owner and a creditor 
of the transferee, the contest is between conflicting claims of ownership—that is 
to say, between competing restitution claims.  Between claimants similarly 
situated, the equities of restitution (like the equities of bankruptcy) favor ratable 
distribution. 
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Nonetheless, it is fundamental that a "person who is unjustly enriched at 
the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution."40  The right of 
the individual creditors to recover from the wayward fiduciary is 
indisputable.41  However, it is likely that the scheme collapsed due to 
insufficient assets,42 and the typical "perpetrator[] lack[s] the financial 
wherewithal to repay the victims of the scheme. . . .  [T]he 
[misappropriated] money dissipates for a variety of reasons."43  In 
Madoff’s case, for example, his personal assets account for less than 5% 
of the actual losses, and an even more trivial percentage of the paper 
losses.44  Though investors are entitled to restitution from the erring 
fiduciary, the insolvency of the scheme and its operator precludes 
meaningful recovery and forces the former investors to pursue other 
restitutionary remedies.45 
C.  Restitution Through Tracing 
The only viable remaining option available to defrauded creditors is 
tracing,46 an option that is often misunderstood within the context of 
restitutionary law.47  The lack of clarity is not surprising given the 
                                                                                                                 
Id. 
 40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (2011). 
 41. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937) ("A person who has been 
unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other."). 
 42. See Mark A. McDermott, Ponzi Schemes and the Law of Fraudulent and 
Preferential Transfers, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 157, 158 (1998) ("[I]t is not uncommon for the 
estates of bankrupt Ponzi schemes to have very few physical or liquid assets.").  For 
example, Madoff was candid about his lack of financial resources when his scheme 
unraveled, stating that his business had "absolutely nothing" in terms of assets.  Bureau of 
National Affairs, SEC, DOJ Charge Wall St. Veteran Over Multi-Billion Dollar Ponzi 
Scheme, 40 SRLR 2049 (Dec. 15, 2008) ("Madoff said his business was insolvent and had 
been so for years."). 
 43. Gradwohl & Corbett, supra note 4, at 205.   
 44. See Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks:  Prospective Contract 
Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 368, 394 (2009) ("[T]he shortfall is staggering given that authorities have located only 
about $830 million in assets belonging to Madoff . . . ."). 
 45. See id. at 395 ("[A]lthough the losing investors can turn to the courts to hold the 
operator of the fraud accountable, they are often forced to look elsewhere because the 
scheme and the operator are insolvent."). 
 46. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining tracing as "[t]he process of 
tracking property’s ownership or characteristics from the time of its origin to the present").   
 47. See ANDREW BURROWS & EWAN MCKENDRICK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE 
LAW OF RESTITUTION 663 (1997) ("It is extremely difficult to pinpoint precisely what tracing 
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nuances (and resulting misapplication) of restitutionary law,48 as well as 
the lack of scholarly attention restitutionary law receives as a whole.49  
Judges and practitioners simply are not well versed in restitutionary law.50  
The interplay between the common law of restitution and the statutory 
law of bankruptcy is particularly cloudy; in the words of Andrew Kull, the 
reporter for the American Law Institute’s (ALI) recently published 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment:  "The 
contemporary treatment of restitution in bankruptcy has become confused 
and haphazard because the subject is not addressed by the Bankruptcy 
Code."51 
  
                                                                                                                 
is concerned with and what its role is within the law of restitution.").  
 48. See Doug Rendleman, Restating Restitution:  The Restatement Process and Its 
Critics, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 933, 936 (2008) ("Restitution is an essential and nuanced 
common law area.  But many smaller American states lack a decision on particular restitution 
points.  States, large and small, have muddled restitution analysis or have made just plain 
incorrect restitution decisions.  Many lawyers, judges, and professors misunderstand and 
misstate basic restitution principles."). 
 49. See Chaim Saiman, Restitution and the Production of Legal Doctrine, 65 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 993, 994 (2008) ("[I]n American legal discourse restitution sits at the backwaters 
of the academic and judicial consciousness . . . ."). 
 50. Kull, supra note 39, at 267 ("Most law schools gave up teaching restitution a 
generation ago, and many judges and practitioners are not familiar with its general principles. 
Lack of familiarity with the restitutionary elements of the background rules results in a 
predictable distortion of commercial law."). 
 51. Id. at 265–66.  Kull further explains: 
Scarcely anyone in the United States understands what restitution is about, to 
begin with, and the particular role of restitution in bankruptcy is further obscured 
by the way in which American commercial law has been codified.  Unlike the 
comprehensive framework of a continental legal code . . . the Bankruptcy Code 
[was] drafted as [a] common-law statute[].  In theory, at least, [it] displace[s] the 
preexisting common law only to the extent [it] alter[s] it, and [it] presume[s] the 
continued existence of this background law to govern every question not otherwise 
resolved.  In practice it does not work quite like that.  Lawyers and judges who 
deal regularly with commercial materials come to expect that any problem worth 
arguing about has been made the subject of an express statutory provision, their 
usual task being to locate and explicate the relevant statutory language.  In 
consequence, the neglected background law recedes still further—until we reach a 
point at which the most orthodox legal proposition, if not tied to a specific code 
section, may actually be challenged as spurious. 
Id. at 266–67. 
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Though tracing is described as both a tool52 and a remedy,53 it is best 
understood as a restitutionary tool.54  Tracing comes into play when a 
pyramid scheme enters bankruptcy (or an equivalent dissolution).55  A trustee 
is appointed to collect assets.56  The assets available to be distributed to 
investors are pinpointed and identified through tracing.  Tracing allows the 
defrauded investor to find, and thus recover, assets that are no longer held by 
the wrongdoer and are now held by third parties.  Once the assets are returned 
to the estate, the court is given broad powers to rule on a plan of distribution, 
subject only to the requirement that the court "use its discretion in a logical 
way to divide the money."57  Though tracing is often suspended in favor of 
pro rata distribution in Ponzi schemes,58 lower courts are given great 
discretion in deciding whether to apportion funds based on tracing fictions59 
or to distribute funds pro rata.60  The hands-off standard of review has led to a 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 58 cmt. a 
(2011) ("Tracing is neither a source of liability nor a distinct restitutionary remedy.  Rather, 
tracing is an adjunct remedial device or technique . . . ."). 
 53. See Dale A. Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace 
Misappropriated Property in Equity and in UCC § 9-306, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 172, 184 (1983) 
("[T]racing is viewed as a remedy . . . implemented through a number of more specific 
remedial devices . . . .").  It is worth noting that the amended Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code no longer addresses tracing in § 9-306.  See U.C.C. § 9-306 (2005).  U.C.C. 
§ 9-315(b)(2) does allow a secured party to trace proceeds "by a method of tracing, including 
application of equitable principles, that is permitted under law other than this article."  U.C.C. 
§ 9-315 (2005). 
 54. See LIONEL D. SMITH, THE LAW OF TRACING 13 (Oxford University Press 1997) 
("The distinction between tracing and claiming is obscured when tracing is referred to as a 
‘right’ or ‘remedy.’  When the exercise of tracing is properly distinguished from the making of 
claims, it is clear that the exercise of tracing is neither right nor remedy."); Peter Birks, Trusts 
in the Recovery of Misapplied Assets:  Tracing, Trusts, and Restitution, in COMMERCIAL 
ASPECTS OF TRUSTS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 149, 157 (Ewan McKendrick ed., 1992) 
("[T]racing should be understood as a process of identification and no more.  It is not in itself a 
remedy."); BURROWS & MCKENDRICK, supra note 47, at 664 ("[T]racing is a technique . . . it 
follows that it is neither a ground for restitution nor a remedy."). 
 55. See Cramer & Pilmer, supra note 36, at 24 ("Failed Ponzi schemes often end up in 
bankruptcy, SEC receivership, Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) liquidation, or 
other formal dissolution proceedings. . . .  Depending on the circumstances, the personal estates 
of Ponzi operators and related business entities may file for liquidation in a bankruptcy or 
through a receiver . . . ."). 
 56. See id. ("Trustees and receivers share the same objective—namely, to return as much 
money as possible to the victims of the scheme."). 
 57. Saiman, supra note 49, at 1011 (citations omitted). 
 58. See infra notes 94–118 and accompanying text (explaining the justifications for and 
operation of pro rata distribution). 
 59. See infra notes 85–93 and accompanying text (discussing the use of tracing fictions). 
 60. See Saiman, supra note 49, at 1013 ("[A] number of [appealed] cases have expressed 
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lack of consistency in "cases pitting the interests of competing claimants to a 
limited pool of assets."61  Due to the emphasis on the trial court’s equitable 
powers to decide the proper remedy, developed case law is limited.62  
Similarly, the power of the bankruptcy trustee to recover transfers to earlier 
investors, and the defenses available to those earlier investors, continue to 
develop and remain a source of confusion.63  In particular, recent 
applications of the trustee’s avoidance power have been alleged to be 
"grossly inequitable and inconsistent with existing . . . law."64  Because the 
law is not settled,65 the bankruptcy court’s approval of the trustee’s formula 
is often appealed, making the recovery process longer and more costly for 
the victims of the fraud. 
III.  Tracing, Tracing Fictions, and Suspension of Tracing in Favor of 
Ratable Distribution of Commingled Funds 
When a pyramid scheme collapses and the operator "becomes a debtor 
under the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy trustee must collect whatever 
assets are available in order to pay both the investors who lost money and 
                                                                                                                 
near-total agnosticism . . . candidly stating that the district court would be within its rights to 
apportion the funds using either the ‘tracing fictions’ or pro rata method, so long as the net 
result was reasonable."). 
 61. Id. at 1003. 
 62. Id. at 1013–14.  As explained by Chaim Saiman: 
[I]nstead of presenting arguments for specific distribution plans on the basis of 
the law of restitution, [most] cases [regarding tracing and restitution] argue for a 
hands-off standard of review.  As a result, the analytic heavy lifting and virtually 
all the citation of legal authorities relate to the law of the standard of review 
rather than to the law of restitution.  To the extent there is any "law" in these 
cases, it is the law governing when a court is within its rights to exercise its 
discretion. 
Id. 
 63. See Kathy Bazoian Phelps, Hon. Steven W. Rhodes, Brenda Moody Whinery & 
Daniel R. Williams, Fraudulent Transfer Claims and Defenses in Ponzi Schemes, in 
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE CLAIMS:  OFFENSE AND DEFENSE, 091009 ABI-CLE 209 
("[C]ourts are continuing to refine the rules which arise in unwinding these tangled financial 
webs. In particular, the law regarding fraudulent transfer claims to recover funds paid by the 
Ponzi debtor to investors as a return of principal or payment of fictitious profits and defenses 
which can be asserted to those claims continue to evolve."). 
 64. Spencer C. Barasch & Sara J. Chesnut, Controversial Uses of the "Clawback" 
Remedy in the Current Financial Crisis, 72 TEX. B.J. 922, 923 (2009). 
 65. See supra notes 49, 63 (explaining that this area of the law has historically been 
unanalyzed and is still developing). 
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any other creditors of the estate."66  The assets available to be distributed to 
investors are pinpointed and identified through tracing.  Tracing is typically 
suspended as between equally innocent investors in cases of commingled 
funds,67 but to understand the reasons for and necessity of suspension, an 
understanding of tracing and the development of the pertinent law is 
important. 
Tracing is most easily understood in the context of constructive trusts 
or equitable liens.  Both are considered traditional equitable remedies to 
prevent unjust enrichment.68  In the words of Justice Cardozo, "[a] 
constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity 
finds expression."69  Under a constructive trust theory, the wrongdoer is 
deemed to hold the absconded property "in trust" for the claimant.70  An 
equitable lien secures the value of the misappropriated property by 
attaching to property owned by the wrongdoer.71  Constructive trusts and 
equitable liens "are similar in that they are available only when the plaintiff 
can establish some connection between the benefit conferred and an 
identifiable asset held by the defendant at the time restitution is sought."72  
Often the claimant can choose which remedy to pursue: 
Where a person wrongfully disposes of property of another knowing that 
the disposition is wrongful and acquires in exchange other property, the 
other is entitled at his option to enforce either (a) a constructive trust of 
the property so acquired, or (b) an equitable lien upon it to secure his 
claim for reimbursement from the wrongdoer.73 
                                                                                                                 
 66. McDermott, supra note 42, at 158. 
 67. See infra notes 94–118 and accompanying text (discussing pro rata sharing). 
 68. Jeffrey Davis, Equitable Liens and Constructive Trusts in Bankruptcy:  Judicial 
Values and the Limits of Bankruptcy Distribution Policy, 41 FLA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989) 
("Constructive trusts and equitable liens are equitable remedies available to vindicate 
restitutionary claims."). 
 69. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919), 
superseded by statute as stated in Israel v. Chabra, 906 N.E.2d 374, 378 (N.Y. 2009) 
(holding that oral consent to waive or amend a contract gives protection to the agent and 
acquits him of a breach of contract). 
 70. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 160 (1937) ("Where a person holding 
title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he 
would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises."). 
 71. See id. § 161 ("Where property of one person can by a proceeding in equity be 
reached by another as security for a claim on the ground that otherwise the former would be 
unjustly enriched, an equitable lien arises."). 
 72. See Davis, supra note 68, at 4. 
 73. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 202 (1937). 
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The remedies differ in that a constructive trust grants the plaintiff title to the 
asset while an equitable lien only places a lien upon the asset.74  Though the 
remedies vary in some significant respects, courts recognize their 
similarities as equitable remedies,75 and the precise differences are not 
important for this Note.  For either remedy, to recover the asset, the 
claimant must prove a restitutionary right and identify his rightful property 
among the wrongdoer’s holdings.76  If the wrongdoer still holds the exact 
property that was wrongfully taken from the claimant, specific 
identification is easy and tracing is not necessary.77  Instead, the claimant 
simply ascertains the current physical location of a tangible asset in a 
process most aptly described as "following."78  However, this is rarely the 
case as the wrongdoer is likely to have converted the asset or otherwise 
disposed of it.79 
Tracing is the substitution process80 that allows the claimant "to follow 
his property through various forms and transactions and establish his 
equitable claim."81  For example, the wrongdoer may have sold the 
misappropriated property for cash.  Proceeds of the sale identifiable in the 
wrongdoer’s bank account belong to the claimant; the change in form is 
immaterial.82  In these direct tracing situations, "[t]he claimant . . . is 
effectively arguing that his ownership rights should be transferred to 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See Davis, supra note 68, at 4 ("The difference between them is that imposition of 
a constructive trust . . . gives the plaintiff title to the asset, whereas imposition of an 
equitable lien merely gives the plaintiff a lien on the asset."). 
 75. See id. at 17 n.65 ("Some courts do not bother to characterize the claim as one or 
the other, referring to the claim instead simply as an ‘equitable right.’"). 
 76. See Davis, supra note 68, at 4. 
 77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 58 cmt. a 
(2011) ("[I]f A’s claim is that B obtained X from A by fraud, and A seeks specific restitution 
of X via constructive trust, there is no need to ‘trace’ if A can still identify X in B’s 
possession."). 
 78. SMITH, supra note 54, at 6; see also Robert Chambers, Tracing and Unjust 
Enrichment, in UNDERSTANDING UNJUST ENRICHMENT 263, 263 (Jason W. Neyers et al. eds., 
2004) ("We follow assets, trace value, and claim rights."). 
 79. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text (explaining that misappropriated 
assets are exhausted for a number of reasons). 
 80. SMITH, supra note 54, at 6 ("[T]he context of tracing is substitution."). 
 81. Claire Seaton Rosa, Note, Should Owners Have to Share?  An Examination of 
Forced Sharing in the Name of Fairness in Recent Multiple Fraud Victim Cases, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 1331, 1338 (2010). 
 82. See George Gleason Bogert, George Taylor Bogert & Amy Morris Hess, 
BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 921 (2010) ("It is a fundamental principle in the English 
common law that a change of form in a thing which is owned does not change the 
ownership."). 
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property that has been substituted for his property, or is the product of his 
property."83  Simply put, "[t]racing is the process of tracking the location of 
value when one asset is exchanged for another."84 
Presumptive tracing, also known as tracing fictions,85 comes into play 
when "indistinguishable property is combined in an undifferentiated mass 
or fund (as when money belonging to two people is deposited in the same 
bank account)."86  Because of the fungible nature of the property "it may be 
impossible to specify the ownership of any particular asset within the fund, 
or of an asset acquired with withdrawals from the fund, except by [tracing] 
rules designed to answer these questions."87  In this scenario, all 
presumptions are drawn in favor of the innocent investor as against the 
wrongdoer.  If the wrongdoer simply deposited the money in a personal 
bank account, the victim will recover the full amount.88 
Illustration:  
Recipient wrongfully takes $100 belonging to Claimant and uses it to 
open an account with Bank.  Recipient then deposits $200 of his own in 
the same account. There are no other transactions in the account. After 
Recipient’s wrongdoing comes to light, Bank attempts to set off the 
$300 balance of the account against Recipient’s unsecured debt to Bank. 
Claimant is entitled to payment of $100 from the account in priority to 
Bank.89 
If the wrongdoer removed any money, it is presumed that the wrongdoer 
withdrew his own funds prior to the funds of the victim.90 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Rosa, supra note 81, at 1342.   
 84. Chambers, supra note 78, at 263. 
 85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 59 cmt. b 
(2011) ("The rules for tracing through a commingled fund are often called ‘tracing 
fictions’ . . . ."). 
 86. Id. cmt. a. 
 87. Id.; see also SMITH, supra note 54, at 1 ("[T]racing should be regulated by 
principles which make sense, and which are supported not just by reason of authority, but by 
the authority of reason.  It should not be regulated by irrational fictions."). 
 88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 59 cmt. c 
(2011) ("The traceable product of the claimant’s assets is readily identifiable in the fund 
itself, or in property acquired with the whole of a commingled fund, if there are no 
intermediate transactions and (consequently) no need for a rule to determine whose money is 
being applied."). 
 89. Id. illus. 1. 
 90. See id. § 59(2)(a) ("If property of the claimant has been commingled by a recipient 
who is a conscious wrongdoer or a defaulting fiduciary (§ 51) or significantly at fault in 
dealing with the claimant’s property (§ 52):  (a) Withdrawals that yield a traceable product 
and withdrawals that are dissipated are marshaled so far as possible in favor of the 
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Illustration:  
Acting without authorization, Recipient deposits $1000 of Claimant’s 
funds in a bank account that already contains $1000 of Recipient’s 
funds.  Recipient later withdraws $1500 from the account, using this 
money for current expenditures.  Claimant is entitled to recover the $500 
remaining in the account via constructive trust or equitable lien, and 
Claimant has an unsecured claim for the balance of the misappropriated 
funds.91 
If there are multiple subsequent withdrawals and deposits, the victim’s 
claim is limited to the lowest intermediate balance.92 
Illustration: 
On July 1, acting without authorization, Recipient deposits $1000 of 
Claimant’s funds in a bank account that already contains $1000 of 
Recipient’s funds.  Recipient files for bankruptcy on December 31; 
Claimant seeks restitution from the traceable product of his $1000 in 
Recipient’s bankruptcy estate.  Between July 1 and December 31, 
Recipient has made numerous withdrawals from the bank account and 
numerous deposits of his own funds; the final balance in the hands of 
the bankruptcy trustee is $3000.  Because Claimant is unable to identify 
the product of any of the withdrawals, Claimant seeks to identify some 
portion of this $3000 as the product of his initial $1000.  From July 1 to 
December 31, the balance of Recipient’s account fluctuated between a 
high of $5000 and a low of $200.  The bankruptcy trustee holds $200 of 
the account in constructive trust for Claimant, and Claimant has an 
unsecured claim in restitution for $800.93 
Although tracing works when there are limited claimants, in Ponzi 
schemes, where the funds of many victims are comingled, individual 
tracing often becomes impossible.94  This problem was recognized at 
common law, when multiple claimants could follow their asset into a 
                                                                                                                 
claimant."). 
 91. Id. illus. 4. 
 92. See id. at § 59(2)(b)–(c) ("Subsequent contributions by the recipient do not restore 
property previously misappropriated from the claimant . . . .  After one or more withdrawals 
from a commingled fund, the portion of the remainder that may be identified as the traceable 
product of the claimant’s property may not exceed the fund’s lowest intermediate balance."). 
 93. Id. illus. 10. 
 94. See id. § 59 (explaining that tracing rules are unequipped to deal with massive 
fraud); Thomas R. Cox, Robert J. Morad & Clarence L. Pozza, Jr., A Review of Recent 
Investor Issues in the Madoff, Stanford and Forte Ponzi Scheme Cases, 10 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 
113, 130 (2010) ("The legal principles often utilized in the Ponzi scheme cases were not 
originally developed to address Ponzi scheme victim fairness issues and create somewhat 
extreme arguments and results."). 
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mixture, but the exact items belonging to each were unidentifiable.95  
Because each claimant had a commensurate right to follow into the mixture, 
but the assets were insufficient to satisfy fully the claims and the claimants 
could not identify their specific assets, the rule became "where there has 
been a diminution of the mixture, the loss will be born by the contributors 
in proportion to their contribution."96  Similarly, under Section 59 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, if "the court 
[cannot] distinguish the interests of multiple restitution claimants by 
reference to actual transactions, such claimants recover ratably from the 
fund and any product thereof in proportion to their respective losses."97 
Illustration: 
Charles Ponzi persuades thousands of victims to entrust their savings to 
him by issuing promissory notes, redeemable in 90 days at $150 for 
each $100 invested.  Notes presented for payment are redeemed with the 
proceeds of the notes subsequently issued.  During the eight-month life 
of the scheme, from December to August, Ponzi issues $15 million in 
promissory notes at an aggregate price of $10 million . . . .  Ponzi has no 
income apart from the sale of the notes, and he is at all relevant times 
insolvent.  Disclosure of the fraud on August 1 provokes a panic.  At the 
close of business on this date Ponzi’s bank balance . . . stands at $6 
million. . . .  Notes presented are redeemed at par until August 9, when 
Ponzi’s account is overdrawn, leaving another $5 million in notes 
unpaid.  Braving the crowds in the streets, certain fraud victims (the 
‘Diligent Creditors’) manage to obtain payment of their notes on August 
4, when the balance of Ponzi’s account—although rapidly declining—
remains positive.  In the ensuing bankruptcy proceedings, Ponzi’s 
Trustee seeks restitution of the payments made to Diligent Creditors on 
the grounds that they constituted an unlawful preference. . . .  Instead, 
Diligent Creditors defend on the ground that they obtained payment on 
August 4 as a result of their own rescission for Ponzi’s fraud (§§ 13, 
54).  On this reasoning they were not paid as creditors from Ponzi’s 
assets: rather they reclaimed, identified, and retook their own money, 
which they identified by the tracing rules of § 59(2).  The argument fails 
to recognize that the relevant dispute over priority is not between 
Diligent Creditors and Ponzi, but rather between Diligent Creditors and 
competing restitution claimants whose equitable position is identical to 
their own.  The presumptions of § 59(2) do not serve to distinguish the 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See SMITH, supra note 54, at 70–72 ("The principles are invoked whenever there is 
no practicable way to determine who contributed what.").   
 96. Id. at 73. 
 97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 59 (2011). 
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interests of the fraud victims inter se.  Holders of notes outstanding on 
August 1 share ratably in Ponzi’s closing balance on that date.98 
In these situations, the individual victimized investors are pitted against one 
another—not against the erring fiduciary—to recover their investments.  
This is problematic because the Ponzi scheme operator, not the co-victims, 
acted wrongfully.  Any remedy imposed should be against the wrongdoer.99  
However, the investors are competing over a limited fund that is 
insufficient to satisfy all their claims.  In practice, the remedies essentially 
do run against other investors and tracing "has nothing to be said for it as a 
principle governing conflicting claims to restitution by equally wronged 
parties."100 
In the first Ponzi scheme case, Cunningham v. Brown,101 the Supreme 
Court held that because none of the claimants could directly trace their 
money, all the victims should share in the fund ratably, each in proportion 
to his own loss.102  The Cunningham Court relied on its inherent equitable 
power to "disregard the rules of restitution and tracing to arrive at an 
‘equitable’ answer"103 that yielded a more just result.104  Cunningham is 
credited with developing the concept that "equity is equality" when there 
are multiple similarly situated fraud victims,105 and it is the paramount case 
cited when tracing is suspended.106   
The Bankruptcy Code "was created for the express purpose of treating 
equally situated creditors equally."107  Because "[a]ll investors in a Ponzi 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. illus. 23. 
 99. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES:  DAMAGES-EQUITY-
RESTITUTION 27 (2d ed. 1993) ("[I]f the right is a right against A, then the remedy must not 
run against B.  B may be unavoidably affected by what happens to A, but no remedy should 
run against B when B has violated no rights."). 
 100. Ruddle v. Moore, 411 F.2d 718, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (concluding that pro rata 
distribution of the recovered commingled funds was proper). 
 101. See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 13 (1924) (finding that the claimants were 
of the same class and equity dictated pro rata distribution). 
 102. Id. at 11–13. 
 103. Saiman, supra note 49, at 1008. 
 104. See Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Irreparably Damaged, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
1642, 1653 (1992) (reviewing DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY 
RULE (1991)) ("One of the ways the legal profession uses the word equity is to describe 
flexible and discretionary decisionmaking, crafting discrete solutions for particular problems 
when inflexible rules would create harsh results."). 
 105. Cunningham, 265 U.S. at 13. 
 106. A Westlaw query reveals that Cunningham v. Brown is cited in 208 subsequent 
cases as well as in hundreds of other briefs, memoranda, and supplemental sources. 
 107. Clemency & Goldberg, supra note 27, at 14; see also Cunningham v. Brown, 265 
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scheme are creditors of the same class . . . [that] in theory . . . should be 
treated equally,"108 the Bankruptcy Code aims to attain equal treatment 
through avoidance.  Avoidance of transfers received by earlier investors is 
premised on the belief that early investors are unfairly (though innocently) 
enriched at the expense of later investors.109  The Ponzi scheme operator 
can only attract new investors so long as his scheme appears profitable, a 
feat which is accomplished by meeting payout demands of early investors.  
To meet the demands, the operator solicits new investments, and because 
the early investors achieve a return on investment, additional new investors 
are drawn into the scheme.110  This circular pattern makes the earlier 
investors unwitting accomplices in continuing the fraud.111  "[T]o allow any 
investor to recover promised returns in excess of the original amount 
invested would be to further the Debtor’s fraudulent scheme at the expense 
of other investors, particularly newer investors."112  From this perspective, 
pro rata distribution is appropriate because the returns given to the early 
redeemers are simply the principal investments of newly solicited 
investors.113 
In order to increase the pool of funds to distribute pro rata, and in the 
interest of equity, the Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee to recapture, or 
                                                                                                                 
U.S. 1, 13 (1924) ("[T]he principle that equality is equity . . . this is the spirit of the bankrupt 
law."). 
 108. Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 871 (D. Utah 
1987). 
 109. See infra note 119 and accompanying text (explaining that most of the traceable 
assets are held by early redeemers, as payouts to early investors are necessary to perpetuate 
the scheme). 
 110. See In re Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. at 860. 
A Ponzi scheme cannot work forever.  The investor pool is a limited resource 
and will eventually run dry.  The perpetrator must know that the scheme will 
eventually collapse as a result of the inability to attract new investors.  The 
perpetrator nevertheless makes payments to present investors, which, by 
definition, are meant to attract new investors. 
Id. 
 111. See In re Taubman, 160 B.R. 964, 981 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993) (authorizing the 
bifurcation of investors’ claims against debtor into actual pecuniary losses and other claimed 
losses in order to treat claimants more equitably).  The Taubman Court noted that "[a]n 
investor in a [P]onzi scheme is not only a victim but at the same time is a perpetrator."  Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See S.E.C. v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., 290 F.3d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 2002) (upholding the 
equitable authority of the District Court to authorize a pro rata distribution plan).  As the 
court noted, "earlier investors’ returns are generated by the influx of fresh capital from 
unwitting newcomers rather than through legitimate investment activity."  Id. 
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clawback,114 money withdrawn by investors.  Voiding transfers helps 
achieve parity between all investors.  Underlying these clawback practices 
is the previously mentioned idea that all the victims should be treated 
similarly.115  Essentially, "all [of] the victims of the same fraud are treated 
as a class and share pro rata in all the assets that any one of them can 
identify as (or trace to) his or her property."116  Even when assets are 
specifically traceable to individual claimants, in situations where claimants 
are similarly situated, lower courts have gone so far as to order pro rata 
distribution117 (however, it is important to note that the upcoming 
Restatement only supports pro rata distribution when individual tracing is 
impossible).118 
Because many of the assets of a Ponzi scheme are paid out to earlier 
investors to keep the scheme operating, the payments received by earlier 
investors constitute a high percentage of the traceable assets.119  In some 
cases, the sums paid out to earlier investors may be the only assets 
recoverable.120  "[C]ourts have long held that is more equitable to attempt to 
                                                                                                                 
 114. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 44, at 370 ("The . . . term—’clawback’—has been 
used to refer to remedies potentially available to defrauded investors in a Ponzi scheme."). 
 115. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (noting that a major purpose of the 
Bankruptcy Code is to treat similarly-situated creditors in a similar manner).   
 116. Hanoch Dagan, Restitution in Bankruptcy:  Why All Involuntary Creditors Should 
Be Preferred, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 252 (2004). 
 117. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Forex Asset Mgmt. LLC, 242 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 2001) 
("Although . . . tracing would have been permissible . . . the district court . . . did not abuse 
its discretion in . . . determining that it was more equitable to distribute the remaining . . . 
assets pro rata."); United States v. Durham, 86 F.3d 70, 73 (5th Cir. 1996) ("No one can 
dispute that tracing would have been permissible under the circumstances of this case.  
Claremont identified its funds . . . .  The government in fact suggested that Claremont receive 
the traced funds.  However, the court, in exercising its discretionary authority in equity, was not 
obliged to apply tracing." (citations omitted)); S.E.C. v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1569–70 (11th 
Cir. 1992) ("We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by disallowing tracing.  
A district court has broad powers and wide discretion to determine the appropriate relief in an 
equity receivership.").  For a critique of "forced sharing" and its place in restitution doctrine, 
see generally Rosa, supra note 81. 
 118. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 59 reporter’s 
note (g) (2011) ("[T]he orthodox approach to multiple-fraud cases returns identifiable assets 
to their owners, turning to pro rata distribution only when specific identification or 
transactional tracing is impossible."). 
 119. See Clawback Lawsuits on Rise in Aftermath of Ponzi Schemes, DIMOND KAPLAN 
& ROTHSTEIN, P.A., http://www.dkrpa.com/Articles/Clawback-Lawsuits-on-Rise-in-
Aftermath-of-Ponzi-Schemes.shtml (last visited Aug. 9, 2011) ("The majority of the 
money . . . is not expected to come from Madoff or the sale of his assets.  Those who are 
expected to pay the lion’s share of the losses are other victims—and those who benefited—
from Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 120. See Barasch & Chesnut, supra note 64, at 924 ("In many cases, the only asset 
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distribute all recoverable assets among the defrauded investors who did not 
recover their initial investments rather than to allow the losses to rest where 
they fell."121  The only meaningful way to reallocate losses in the context of 
a Ponzi scheme is often through avoidance of transfers to earlier investors.  
The panoply of tools available to the trustee to effectuate a more equitable 
distribution between early and late investors includes avoiding actual 
fraudulent transfers, constructive fraudulent transfers, and preferential 
transfers.122 
IV.  Avoidance Under the Bankruptcy Code 
Under § 548 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, the trustee can 
avoid fraudulent conveyances based on actual fraud or constructive fraud 
that are made within the two years preceding the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition.123  Section 544(b) of the Code allows the trustee to avoid 
fraudulent conveyances based on state law,124 which often has the impact of 
lengthening the applicable statute of limitations or reachback period.125  
Pursuant to § 547, the trustee may avoid, as preferences, the full amount of 
transfers made within the ninety days prior to the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition.126 
A.  Actual Fraudulent Transfers 
Fraudulent conveyance claims based on actual fraud, also referred to 
as fraud in fact,127 are pursued under Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(1)(A), 
which provides as follows:  
                                                                                                                 
available to provide any payment to the many investors and other creditors are legal claims 
to recover sums paid out by the entity before the crash."). 
 121. Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 776 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 122. 11 U.S.C. §§ 547–48 (2010). 
 123. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2010). 
 124. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2010) ("[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest 
of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under 
applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim . . . ."). 
 125. See infra notes 131–32 and accompanying text (explaining that state law often 
lengthens these time periods). 
 126. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2010). 
 127. See 37 C.J.S. Fraudulent Conveyances § 74 (2010) ("[A] transfer may be 
characterized as actual fraud, or as one fraudulent in fact if it was made with the intent to 
defraud creditors . . . ."); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 3 (2010) ("Moral fraud, positive fraud, and fraud 
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The trustee may avoid any transfer (including any transfer to or for the 
benefit of an insider under an employment contract) of an interest of the 
debtor in property, or any obligation (including any obligation to or for 
the benefit of an insider under an employment contract) incurred by the 
debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of 
the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily 
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, 
on or after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was 
incurred, indebted . . . .128 
Under an actual fraud allegation, the full amount withdrawn by the investor 
is subject to clawback.129  "A transfer that constitutes [actual fraud] may be 
avoided in its entirety—as to both invested principal and profits—whether 
or not the debtor received value in exchange for the transfer."130  Many 
states substantially extend the two-year statute of limitation131 or extend the 
lookback period.132  Section 544(b) allows the trustee to avoid transfers that 
an actual unsecured creditor could avoid under state law.133  Most states 
                                                                                                                 
in fact are the same as actual fraud . . . ."). 
 128. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2010).  
 129. Id. 
 130. In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 439 B.R. 284, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 131. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2010) (detailing the two-year congressionally imposed 
statute of limitations).  Under state law, the time frame for bringing suit can be extended.  
For example, New York law extends the two-year time period to six years.  McKinney’s 
CPLR § 213 (2004) (noting that for an action based upon fraud, "the time within which the 
action must be commenced shall be the greater of six years from the date the cause of action 
accrued or two years from the time the plaintiff . . . discovered the fraud, or could with 
reasonable diligence have discovered it"). 
 132. See Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 47 (2002) (explaining that the lookback 
period is a designated amount of time preceding the bankruptcy in which the transfers made 
are subject to avoidance).  "The lookback period is a limitations period because it prescribes 
a period within which certain rights . . . may be enforced."  Id.  The Bankruptcy Code allows 
transfers made within two years preceding the filing to be attacked as fraudulent.  11 U.S.C. 
§ 548 (2010).  This period can be lengthened under state law.  See Cherry & Wong, supra 
note 44, at 398 ("[T]he reachback time period for fraudulent transfer claims under most state 
laws (which are based on either the UFTA or UFCA) is four years."); Lara R. Sheikh, 
Sections 548 and 550—Developments in the Law of Fraudulent Transfers and Recoveries, 
2010 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW 8 ("The two-year limitation in [section 548] is augmented 
by the operation of section 544(b), allowing the trustee to bootstrap into state fraudulent 
conveyance law, which in turn can offer a lookback period of four or more years.").  
California has a particularly long lookback period of seven years for actual fraudulent 
transfers.  See Cramer & Pilmer, supra note 36, at 27 ("California law provides a seven-year 
statute of repose for intentionally fraudulent transfer claims." (citing Cal. Civ. Code 
§ 3439.09(c))). 
 133. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (2010). 
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have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA), which has a 
four-year lookback period, although some states continue to use the 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act (UFCA), which provides for a six-
year lookback period.134  Thus, the trustee is able to take advantage of 
longer time periods provided by state law.  The investor does not need to 
intend to hinder, delay, or defraud.  "Actual fraudulent conveyance claims 
under Section 548(a)(1)(A) turn on the intent of the debtor in making the 
transfer; the state of mind of the transferee is irrelevant."135  Accordingly, 
any transfer made as the result of a Ponzi scheme is presumed to be 
fraudulent.136  Despite this Ponzi scheme presumption, the investor may be 
able to retain at least some of the transferred funds under an affirmative 
good faith defense, which "is practically the only defense for investors who 
are sued by Ponzi scheme bankruptcy trustees."137  Because all transfers 
made pursuant to Ponzi schemes are presumed fraudulent, the investor 
carries the burden of proof in establishing good faith.  This defense is 
provided for in § 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code:  
[A] transferee or obligee of such a transfer or obligation that takes for 
value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest 
transferred or may enforce any obligation incurred . . . to the extent that 
such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for such 
transfer or obligation.138  
The former investor must affirmatively prove good faith in order to not be 
divested of his or her principal.  Regardless of good faith, the investor will 
be forced to repay all fictitious profits withdrawn. 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Arthur J. Steinberg & John F. Isbell, Protecting Redemptions in a Ponzi Scheme 
Case, 241 N.Y. L.J. 9 (2009); U.F.T.A. § 4 (1984); U.F.C.A. § 7 (1918). 
 135. In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 439 B.R. at 304.   
 136. See, e.g., Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners (In re Agricultural Research and Tech. 
Grp., Inc.), 916 F.2d 528, 535 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that a debtor’s actual intent can be 
inferred from the mere existence of a Ponzi scheme); Jobin v. Waukau (In re M&L Bus. 
Mach. Co.), 166 B.R. 723, 724 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1993) ("[I]n a Ponzi scheme the only 
inference a court can make is that the Debtor had the requisite intent to hinder, delay or 
defraud under § 548(a)(1)."), aff’d, 167 B.R. 219 (D. Colo. 1994). 
 137. Paul Sinclair & Brendan McPherson, The Sad Tale of Fraudulent Transfers:  Part 
III, 29-3 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, at 41 (2010). 
 138. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2010). 
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B.  Constructive Fraudulent Transfers 
A second theory under which the trustee may proceed is that of 
constructive fraud.  Actual fraud and constructive fraud "are distinguished 
by the presence or absence of an intent to deceive."139  Constructive fraud, 
also known as "fraud in law,"140 is presumed from the circumstances of the 
transaction.141  Despite the absence of specific intent to defraud, the transfer 
is construed as fraudulent due to its "detrimental effect upon public interests 
and public or private confidence."142  Under the constructive fraud theory, 
the trustee may only recover the profits—any return above the investor’s 
original outlay—unless the investor can affirmatively prove a lack of good 
faith.143  Thus, the major difference between actual fraud and constructive 
fraud is the allocation of the burden of proof on the issue of good faith.144  
Section 548(a)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code states: 
The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . that was made or incurred on or 
within 2 years before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor 
voluntarily or involuntarily received less than a reasonably equivalent 
value in exchange for such transfer or obligation and was insolvent on 
                                                                                                                 
 139. 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 3 (2010). 
 140. Id. ("[L]egal fraud and fraud in law are merely other names for constructive 
fraud."). 
 141. Id. ("[A] fraud is legal or constructive where it is implied from the nature of the 
contract or transaction or from the relation of the parties."). 
 142. 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 9 (2010). 
 143. See Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762, 780 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the 
receiver’s recovery of profits from investors was not inequitable).  As explained by Donell: 
In the context of a Ponzi scheme, whether the receiver seeks to recover from 
winning investors under the actual fraud or constructive fraud theories generally 
does not impact the amount of recovery from innocent investors.  Under the 
actual fraud theory, the receiver may recover the entire amount paid to the 
winning investor, including amounts which could be considered ‘return of 
principal.’  However, there is a ‘good faith’ defense that permits an innocent 
winning investor to retain funds up to the amount of the initial outlay.  Under the 
constructive fraud theory, the receiver may only recover ‘profits’ above the 
initial outlay, unless the receiver can prove a lack of good faith, in which case 
the receiver may also recover the amounts that could be considered return of 
principal. 
Id. at 771. 
 144. Id. ("The Seventh Circuit has suggested that the only practical distinction between 
these theories of recovery is the allocation of burdens of proof.") (citing Scholes v. 
Lehmann, 56 F.3d 750, 756–57 (7th Cir. 1995)). 
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the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, or 
became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation . . . .145 
By definition, in a Ponzi scheme, the liabilities of the operator outweigh the 
assets, so the debtor’s insolvency is easy to prove.  "[C]ourts have held that 
a debtor operating a Ponzi scheme is deemed insolvent from its inception as 
a matter of law."146  Moreover, any profits withdrawn by the investor in 
excess of his principal investment will by definition exceed the value he 
invested.  "[A] debtor does not receive a reasonably equivalent value for 
any payments made to the winning investor that represent profits since such 
profits are regarded as having been gained through theft from losing 
investors."147  Under a constructive fraud theory, the investor will be forced 
to remit all fictitious profits withdrawn and, if the trustee can prove a lack 
of good faith, the investor may also be required to forfeit his principal. 
C.  Preferential Transfers 
A preferential transfer is simply a transfer made by the debtor, while 
the debtor was insolvent, within ninety days of bankruptcy, on account of a 
debt owed, and which allows the creditor to receive more than it would in 
bankruptcy.148  Preferential transfers differ from fraudulent transfers as they 
can be avoided absent any intent to defraud, and even if equivalent value 
was given, so long as the transfer was more than the creditor would have 
otherwise received under a bankruptcy distribution.  The purpose of the 
preferential transfer statute is to ensure that creditors receive equal portions 
of the available assets.149  Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code states: 
[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in 
property (1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2) for or on account of an 
                                                                                                                 
 145. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2010).  
 146. Cherry & Wong, supra note 44, at 402; see also Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 
558 (5th Cir. 2006) ("[A] Ponzi scheme . . . is, as a matter of law, insolvent from its 
inception."); Guy v. Abdulla, 57 F.R.D. 14, 17 (N.D. Ohio 1972) ("In a Ponzi-type 
operation, it may be possible to establish that the bankrupt was insolvent from the very 
inception . . . ."); Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 8 (1924) ("[Ponzi] was always 
insolvent, and became daily more so . . . ."). 
 147. Cherry & Wong, supra note 44, at 401. 
 148. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2010); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) 
(outlining the necessary components of a preferential transfer). 
 149. See Gill v. Winn (In re Perma Pac. Properties), 983 F.2d 964, 968 (10th Cir. 1992) 
("It is the ultimate aim of the preference law in the Bankruptcy Code to insure that all 
creditors receive an equal distribution from the available assets of the debtor."). 
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antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made; 
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) made . . . on or within 90 
days before the date of the filing of the petition . . . [; and] (5) that 
enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive 
if . . . the transfer had not been made . . . .150 
In the context of a Ponzi scheme, these requirements are easily met.  
Because Ponzi schemes are always insolvent, any transfer within ninety 
days of bankruptcy would occur during insolvency.151  Moreover, § 547(f) 
specifically provides that "[f]or the purposes of this section, the debtor is 
presumed to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately 
preceding the date of the filing of the petition."152  The transfer would be in 
repayment of the earlier investment.  Because the investor (creditor) would 
probably receive very little in a bankruptcy distribution, most transfers—
even ones returning principal only—would presumably exceed the recovery 
amount typically received.  Accordingly, the investor will be compelled to 
repay all funds received within the 90-day period. 
V.  Shortcomings of the Current Statutory Scheme 
The current statutory scheme does not adequately address the 
transactional realities of Ponzi schemes.  The shortcomings of the 
Bankruptcy Code, coupled with the almost unbridled discretion of the 
trustee, results in inequitable outcomes between similarly positioned 
investors. 
A.  Actual Fraud:  Abrogation of the Good Faith Defense 
When actual fraud is alleged, the creditor may be able to utilize the 
affirmative defense of good faith to retain the principal amount invested.153  
The good faith defense is provided for in § 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code:  
[A] transferee or obligee of such a transfer or obligation that takes for 
value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any interest 
                                                                                                                 
 150. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2010). 
 151. Cherry & Wong, supra note 44, at 402 ("[C]ourts have held that a debtor operating 
a Ponzi scheme is deemed insolvent from its inception as a matter of law."). 
 152. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (2010). 
 153. See In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc., 232 B.R. 565, 573 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1999) 
("[S]ection [548(c)] has been construed as an affirmative defense, all elements of which 
must be proven by the defendant-transferee."). 
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transferred or may enforce any obligation incurred . . . to the extent that 
such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for such 
transfer or obligation.154 
Because a good faith transferee may retain funds "to the extent" that value 
was given, the investor can retain the principal.155  However, the definition 
of "good faith" has narrowed over the years,156 which means that truly 
innocent investors, who are already victims of a financial fraud and did not 
receive the benefit of their bargain, are further penalized by having to repay 
principal. 
Complicating the good faith analysis is the fact that the term "is not 
defined in the [Bankruptcy] Code."157  Though "[t]here is no legislative 
history," commentators proffer that Congress would have ascribed the 
traditional interpretation to the requirement of good faith, which is a 
subjective standard.158  Perhaps surprisingly, even the SEC envisions a 
subjective standard as the appropriate standard.  One judge recently 
criticized the SEC’s position stating: "In imposing this ‘mens rea’ 
requirement, the SEC . . . [has] effectively limited the Receiver’s recovery 
of principal to those winning investors who shared [the wrongdoer’s] 
criminal intent."159  The modern interpretation of good faith as an objective 
standard diverges from the SEC’s interpretation.  Moreover, it is "at odds 
with decades of tradition interpreting fraudulent transfer law"160 and it 
conflicts with the meaning ascribed to good faith under the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC), which was the major piece of commercial 
legislation in effect at the time the Bankruptcy Code was drafted.161 
                                                                                                                 
 154. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2010).   
 155. Id. 
 156. See Paul Sinclair, The Sad Tale of Fraudulent Transfers:  The Unscrupulous Are 
Rewarded and the Diligent Are Punished, 28-3 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16, at 10 (2009) 
[hereinafter Sinclair (Part I)] ("[T]he ‘modern trend’ [is] evidenced by a series of bankruptcy 
decisions that sharply limit the good-faith defense."). 
 157. Id. at 79–80. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Cox, Morad & Pozza, supra note 94, at 119 (quoting S.E.C. v. Forte, Nos. 09-63, 
09-64, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116802, *13 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2009)). 
 160. Sinclair (Part I), supra note 156, at 77. 
 161. See Craig T. Lutterbein, "Fraud and Deceit Abound" but Do the Bankruptcy 
Courts Really Believe Everyone Is Crooked:  The Bayou Decision and the Narrowing of 
"Good Faith," 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 405, 444 (2010) ("‘Good faith’ is a term used in 
many provisions of the UCC.  The UCC standard for ‘good faith’ in nearly every one of its 
articles was subjective in 1978 when the Bankruptcy Code was enacted and in section 1-201 
the 1978 UCC defined good faith as honesty in fact."). 
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Until recently, courts consistently applied a subjective standard.  As 
detailed in the seminal case of Tacoma Ass’n of Credit Men v. Lester:162 
There have been numerous efforts to define the term good faith.  These 
efforts, if viewed as a whole, seem to attribute three factors or indicia to 
good faith:  (1) An honest belief in the propriety of the activities in 
question; (2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others; and 
(3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the activities in question 
will, hinder, delay, or defraud others.163 
Justice Souter, while a First Circuit judge, distinguished between fraudulent 
transfers and preferential transfers, concluding that a preferential transfer 
was not a fraudulent transfer.164  In Boston Trading Group, Inc. v. 
Burnazos,165 he noted that: 
[F]raudulent conveyance law does not seek to void transfers . . . known 
as a preference.  Suppose a debtor owes A $10,000 and B $20,000. He 
has only $8000, which he uses to satisfy his debt to A.  This conveyance 
may be unfair to B, but it is not a fraudulent conveyance because it 
satisfies a debt owed to a person who is, at least, a legitimate creditor.  B 
must find a remedy in bankruptcy, or in some other, law.  The basic 
object of fraudulent conveyance law is to see that the debtor uses his 
limited assets to satisfy some of his creditors; it normally does not try to 
choose among them.166 
Preferences are subject to avoidance in bankruptcy proceedings,167 but not 
as fraudulent transfers.  A narrow reading of the good faith defense 
essentially "confuses the distinct goals of preference law and fraudulent 
transfer law."168  The Burnazos court specifically noted that the receipt of a 
preferential transfer simply was not synonymous with a lack of good faith:  
Whatever good faith may mean . . . it does not ordinarily refer to the 
transferee’s knowledge of the source of the debtor’s monies which the 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Tacoma Ass’n of Credit Men v. Lester, 433 P.2d 901, 905 (Wash. 1967) (holding 
that the appellant did not meet his burden of proving good faith and thus the transfers made 
were properly avoided as fraudulent). 
 163. Id. at 904.  
 164. Sinclair (Part 1), supra note 156, at 78 (noting the distinction between the two 
types of transfers).   
 165. Boston Trading Grp., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1510 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(holding that while the claims alleged were insufficient to support a cause of action for 
actual fraud, the case had to be remanded to consider constructive fraud). 
 166. Id. at 1508–09. 
 167. See supra Part IV.C (discussing the preferential transfer statute in the Bankruptcy 
Code).   
 168. Lutterbein, supra note 161, at 458. 
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debtor obtained at the expense of other creditors.  To find a lack of good 
faith where the transferee does not participate in, but only knows that 
the debtor created the other debt through some form of, dishonesty is to 
void the transaction because it amounts to a kind of preference—
concededly a most undesirable kind of preference, one in which the 
claims of alternative creditors differ considerably in their moral worth, 
but a kind of preference nonetheless.169 
Conversely, the modern good faith standard is objective, not 
subjective, so actual good faith is irrelevant.170  If the defendant knew or 
should have known that "the debtor’s investment scheme was too good to 
be true, then . . . the trustee is entitled to recover all amounts the investor 
received from the debtor."171  Some commentators suggest that the narrow 
reading of the good faith defense is an intentional effort by courts to reach 
all payments, not just profits, so that early and late investors are at parity.172  
This view is also shared by some judges, who view the narrow reading as 
judicial activism: 
[Some] [c]ourts . . . appear to believe that a "just" solution to the losses 
suffered by the innocent investors in a "Ponzi" scheme requires some 
reallocation of the risks and redistribution of the losses beyond that 
provided for by Congress in Section 547(b). . . .  [T]he fraudulent 
conveyance statutes cannot and should not be utilized by courts as a 
super preference statute to effect a further reallocation and redistribution 
that should be specifically provided for in a statute enacted by Congress.  
The Section 548(a) and state law fraudulent conveyance statutes 
implement a policy of preventing the diminution of a debtor’s estate.  
The Section 547(b) preference statute implements a principal policy of 
equality of distribution.  By forcing the square peg facts of a "Ponzi" 
scheme into the round holes of the fraudulent conveyance statutes in 
order to accomplish a further reallocation and redistribution to 
implement a policy of equality of distribution in the name of equity, I 
believe that many courts have done a substantial injustice to those 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Boston Trading Grp., Inc., 835 F.2d at 1512. 
 170. See Jobin v. Waukau (In re M&L Bus. Mach. Co.), 166 B.R. 723, 724 (Bankr. D. 
Colo. 1993) (adopting an objective standard for good faith by examining what the defendant 
"knew or should have known" rather than examining the defendant’s actual, subjective 
knowledge). 
 171. McDermott, supra note 42, at 177. 
 172. See Cherry & Wong, supra note 44, at 404 ("[B]ecause the typical losing investor 
nonetheless remains at an unfair disadvantage, courts have sought to rectify the balance . . . .  
[C]ourts have begun to adopt a narrower reading of the good faith defense so as to 
potentially reach all payments received by an investor from the scheme . . . not just . . . 
fictitious profits."). 
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statutes and have made policy decisions that should be made by 
Congress.173 
Despite criticism, there has been an undeniable narrowing of the 
affirmative defense.  In re Bayou Group, LLC174 sets forth the modern 
approach to determining good faith after first noting that "[t]he lack of 
clarity in the cases [in defining good faith] undoubtedly reflects a tension 
between a policy of protecting creditors from fraudulent transfers, and a 
policy of promoting the ease and security of commercial transactions."175  
The Bayou district court went on to present a two-step test to determine 
good faith: 
The first question . . . is whether the transferee had information that put 
it on inquiry notice that the transferor was insolvent or that the transfer 
might be made with a fraudulent purpose . . . these two elements are 
consistently identified as the triggers for inquiry notice. . . . Once a 
transferee has been put on inquiry notice of either the transferor’s 
possible insolvency or of the possibly fraudulent purpose of the transfer, 
the transferee must satisfy a "diligent investigation" requirement. . . .  
The test is most commonly phrased . . . as whether "diligent inquiry 
would have discovered the fraudulent purpose" of the transfer.176 
Under the two-prong analysis, it must first be ascertained what actions 
constitute "inquiry notice."177  The Bayou bankruptcy court compiled 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Lustig v. Weisz (In re Unified Commercial Capital, Inc.), 260 B.R. 343, 349–50 
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2001) aff’d sub nom. In re Unified Commercial Capital, 01-MBK-6004L, 
2002 WL 32500567 (W.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002) (holding that a loan met the requirement of 
"reasonably equivalent value" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code’s fraudulent 
transfer provision). 
 174. See In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 439 B.R. 284, 308 & 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding 
that although a prima facie case of actual fraud was established, factual issues relating to the 
good faith defense precluded summary judgment). 
 175. Id. at 309 n.22.  As explained by the district court in In re Bayou Group: 
The two-year fraudulent conveyance period itself reflects a compromise 
between competing values.  Congress could have provided for recovery 
whenever an investor has received a transfer from an insolvent entity and has 
been paid with another investor’s money . . . .  It also could have set a longer 
period for recovery than two years.  In recognition of the fact that concepts of 
fairness and equity must yield at some point to the competing values of insuring 
the "ease and security of commercial transactions," however, Congress cut off 
such claims after two years. 
Id. at 339.  
 176. Id. at 310–12. 
 177. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining inquiry notice as "[n]otice 
attributed to a person when the information would lead an ordinarily prudent person to 
investigate the matter further").  Inquiry notice is when the duty to conduct further 
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instances where other courts "held that inquiry notice . . . preclude[d] a 
finding of good faith, including inquiry notice of the:  fraudulent purpose of 
the transfer; underlying fraud; unfavorable financial condition for the 
transferor; insolvency of the transferor; improper nature of the transaction; 
[and] voidability of the transfer."178  However, the court noted that these 
factors were not dispositive, and questions of good faith must be decided on 
a case-by-case basis.179  Although the factors constituting inquiry notice are 
quite broad, the district court reversed an even more expansive 
interpretation approved by the bankruptcy court.180 
In regards to the "diligent investigation" requirement, the Bayou 
bankruptcy court embraced a high standard: 
"[D]iligent investigation" must ameliorate the issues that placed the 
transferee on inquiry notice in the first place.  In other words, if the 
diligent investigation aggravates, rather than allays, the concerns placing 
the transferee on inquiry notice, then no "good faith" defense is 
supported.  Moreover, a transferee cannot satisfy the "diligent 
investigation" prong of the good faith test merely by inquiring with the 
transferor itself, even were the transferor to provide a plausible 
explanation of the issues. . . .  [A] "diligent investigation" requires more 
than merely asking the transferor about the suspicious circumstances.  In 
other words, a transferee cannot put his head in the sand in the face of 
unusual or suspicious circumstances and then take advantage of the 
"good faith" defense afforded by section 548(c). . . .  [O]nce on inquiry 
notice, "taking no steps at all would . . . amount[] to ‘willful ignorance,’ 
which would . . . defeat[] the good faith defense."181 
In theory, "[a]n objective, reasonable investor standard applies to both the 
inquiry notice and the diligent investigation components of the good faith 
test."182  Despite the intended uniform application, in practice, courts hold 
                                                                                                                 
investigation is triggered.  Id. 
 178. In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 396 B.R. 810, 845–46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 439 B.R. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying the investors’ good faith 
defenses and granting summary judgment). 
 179. Id. at 846. 
 180. See In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 439 B.R. 284, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("[T]he 
Bankruptcy Court broadly held that information suggesting some potential infirmity in the 
investment or some infirmity in the integrity of its management is a sufficient trigger.  The 
Bankruptcy Court’s expansion of the scope of information sufficient to trigger inquiry notice 
is not supported by . . . case law and requires reversal . . . ."). 
 181. In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 396 B.R. 810, 846–47 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 439 B.R. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citations omitted). 
 182. In re Bayou Grp., LLC, 439 B.R. 284, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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educated parties to a higher standard of due diligence.183  Accordingly, 
"courts have generally been willing to find that knowledgeable investors 
did not act in objective good faith if their investment program showed 
significant signs of irregularity."184  For example, in one of the rare cases 
where the court did not grant summary judgment against the defendants on 
the matter of good faith, it specifically noted the defendants’ lack of 
sophistication, their smaller investments, and their less-prestigious jobs.185  
Institutional investors are also held to a more rigorous standard as they are 
presumably more sophisticated and have more resources to investigate, 
adding yet another standard of "reasonable" to the determination of good 
faith.186 
Also problematic with the good faith defense is that savvy investors 
are presumably held to a higher standard than governmental monitoring 
agencies.187  The SEC was informed of the fraudulent nature of Madoff’s 
firm yet never uncovered the massive fraud.188  If the SEC was unable to 
                                                                                                                 
 183. See id. ("Some courts have held that the standard . . . requires a specific focus on 
the class or category of the transferee. . . .  [W]hether a transferee is on inquiry notice is 
informed by the standards, norms, practices, sophistication, and experience generally 
possessed by participants in the transferee’s industry or class."). 
 184. McDermott, supra note 42, at 179. 
 185. See Merrill v. Abbott (In re Indep. Clearing House Co.), 77 B.R. 843, 862 n.29 (D. 
Utah 1987) (denying summary judgment).  The court stated: 
The record shows certain facts from which the bankruptcy court might have 
drawn an inference that the defendants took in good faith. . . . [The] court 
may . . . have concluded that the undertakers generally were unsophisticated in 
investment matters, from the modest amounts some of the defendants advanced, 
by the jobs some held (as reflected in their answers to interrogatories) and by the 
fact that many of the defendants appeared pro se, suggesting either that they 
could not afford a lawyer or did not realize the need for one. 
Id. 
 186. See Jeff F. Freidman & Anthony L. Paccione, Clawback of Fraudulent Transfers 
from Investors—"Good Faith" Defense Update, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=218b746c-3690-4378-a4f6-c0bfe02d3bf1 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2011) (noting that the Bayou district court "found that the nature of the 
transferee mattered in the good faith defense") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 187. See Untangling Madoff’s "Winners" And Losers, NPR (July 27, 2010), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128802589 ("[I]t [is] hard to believe 
that institutional investors and so-called feeder funds didn’t see the red flags raised by 
Madoff’s claims.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 188. See Ralph A. Midkiff, Recovering Losses When Schemes Are Exposed, 2009 
ASPATORE SPECIAL REP. 4 ("The SEC had been tipped that [Madoff’s firm] was a Ponzi 
scheme, yet did little or no serious investigation to verify . . . .  The SEC did not take the 
charges seriously, and never issued formal subpoenas to Madoff for his books and records."). 
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catch schemes like Madoff’s, despite receiving tips on its probable 
fraudulent nature189 and conducting at least five investigations over nearly 
two decades,190 individual investors with substantially fewer resources and 
more limited access to financial data should not be charged with having a 
reason to suspect the integrity of the investment necessitating further 
investigation.  If anything, an SEC investigation revealing no evidence of 
fraud should have relieved any investor concerns.  The SEC also failed to 
vet Madoff when he registered as an investment advisor in 2006.191 
Moreover, the "red flags" obvious with hindsight might not have been 
sufficient to put the investor on notice.  Indeed, the appearance of 
legitimacy is what makes Ponzi schemes so damaging.192  For example, the 
consistency of Madoff’s returns was remarkable, but the percentage of 
returns was not necessarily unparalleled in the market.193  Madoff’s 
investment strategy also seemed plausible.194  The split-strike conversion 
strategy195 he claimed to employ does minimize downside risk and tends to 
lead to more consistent, if less lucrative, returns on investment.196  The 
                                                                                                                 
 189. See id. (discussing the failure of the SEC to uncover Madoff’s scheme despite 
receiving tips on its fraudulent nature). 
 190. See Debra Cassens Weiss, SEC Lawyer Warned About Madoff in 2004, A.B.A. J. 
(July 2, 2009, 7:06 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/sec_lawyer_warned_ 
about_madoff_in_2004/ (last visited on Aug. 9, 2011) ("The SEC investigated Madoff’s 
firms at least five times over nearly 20 years, including in 2007 after rival Harry Markopolos 
complained that Madoff’s improbable returns were likely the result of a Ponzi scheme . . . .") 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 191. See Campos, supra note 12, at 593 ("Traditionally, when an investment adviser 
registers with the Agency, the Office of Compliance, Inspections, and Examinations 
scrutinizes and examines the investor—in this case the SEC did not."). 
 192. See S.E.C. v. Forte, CIV.09-63, 2009 WL 4809804, *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2009) 
("Ponzi schemes are pernicious because they masquerade as legitimate investments."). 
 193. See Efrati, Lauricella & Searcey, supra note 2 (noting that one fund averaged a 
10.5% annual return). 
 194. See Gradwohl & Corbett, supra note 4, at 217 ("The successful schemes make the 
tale told by the perpetrator appear reasonable."). 
 195. See Assessing the Madoff Ponzi Scheme and Regulatory Failure:  Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 6 (2009) (testimony of Harry Markopolos, 
Chartered Financial Analyst, Certified Fraud Examiner) [hereinafter Hearings], available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/markopolos020409.pdf 
(explaining the split-strike conversion strategy and outlining its three main parts).  "Part I is 
a . . . grouping of stocks that you purchase. . . .  Part II consists of the call options that you 
are selling to generate income.  Part III consists of the put options that you will be buying to 
protect your stock portfolio from market price declines . . . ."  Id. 
 196. See Carole Bernard & Phelim P. Boyle, Mr. Madoff’s Amazing Returns:  An 
Analysis of the Split-Strike Conversion Strategy, 17 J. DERIVATIVES 62, *2 (2009), available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1371320 ("This strategy involves taking a long position in 
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complex transactions generate confusion even among trained market 
professionals.197  Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit opined that 
Madoff’s scheme did not have the hallmarks of a typical Ponzi scheme:  
The strategy . . . attributed to Madoff is the opposite of that of the 
typical Ponzi schemer:  it [wa]s to obtain investments from well-off 
people far more financially sophisticated than the average Ponzi victim, 
including genuine financial experts such as hedge fund managers and 
bank officials.  And therefore it require[d] different tactics from that of 
the ordinary Ponzi scheme, such as offering returns only moderately 
above average, satisfying redemption requests promptly, turning down 
some would-be investors . . . , and trading on a reputation earned in a 
legitimate business (Madoff’s business of market making).198 
An objective good faith standard contravenes congressional intent, 
confuses the goals of fraudulent and preferential transfer law, unfairly 
penalizes savvier investors with actual good faith based on their status 
alone, demands investors to be more diligent than the SEC itself, and 
assumes (with the benefit of hindsight) that investors saw the "red flags." 
B.  Preferential Transfers:  Reallocation of an Arbitrary Line 
In practice, by voiding the "preference" of investors who withdraw 
money within three months (90 days) of bankruptcy, investors who fall 
outside the three-month statute of limitations receive preferential 
treatment.199  In In re Independent Clearing House Co.,200 the court 
explained that § 547 simply reallocates where the arbitrary line is drawn:  
                                                                                                                 
equities together with a short call and a long put on an equity index to lower the volatility of 
the position."). 
 197. See Hearings, supra note 195, at 7 (testimony of Harry Markopolos) ("[T]he 
strategy is complex enough . . . that even market professionals without derivatives 
experience would have trouble keeping track . . . and understanding . . . fully."). 
 198. See Richard Posner, Bernard Madoff and Ponzi Schemes—Posner’s Comment, 
BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Dec. 21, 2008, 3:45 PM), http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/2008/12/bernard-madoff-and-ponzi-schemes--posners-comment.html (last visited 
Aug. 9, 2011) ("Madoff’s scheme . . . is not a classic Ponzi scheme.") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 199. See In re Indep. Clearing House Co., 77 B.R. 843, 871 (D. Utah 1987) (explaining 
that the application of § 547 is limited and the transfers that cannot be reached are thus 
treated more favorable). 
 200. Id. at 875 (holding in part that the trustee was not entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law on the preferential transfer claims). 
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For a Ponzi scheme that lasts more than three months, the statute[] . . . 
does not go far enough.  By definition, an enterprise engaged in a Ponzi 
scheme is insolvent from day one.  Thus, all transfers to investors in a 
Ponzi scheme are preferential, not just those made within the three 
months before bankruptcy.  Every transfer prefers the transferee to those 
investors at the end of the line.  The evil of a preferential transfer is that 
it "unfairly permit[s] a particular creditor to be treated more favorably 
than other creditors of the same class."  All investors in a Ponzi scheme 
are creditors of the same class, so in theory all should be treated equally.  
In effect, though, applying section 547 to a Ponzi scheme . . . favors 
some creditors over others.  Under section 547 the creditors who are 
most preferred are allowed to keep their preferential payments because 
the transfers were made outside the statutory period . . . .  The statute 
simply does not reach the early investors.  Thus, applying the statute as 
written, the court is "compelled to take part in a farce whose result is . . . 
to take away from those who have little, the little that they have."  The 
equitable solution would be either to apply the statute to all transfers to 
investors in a Ponzi scheme—without regard to when the transfers were 
made—or to apply the statute to none of the transfers.201 
The preferential transfer statute applies to a small fraction of transfers in the 
context of a multiple decade fraud.  Investors who redeemed prior to the 90-
day period are simply outside its scope.  Because earlier investors are likely 
the ones that received substantial fictitious profits, the preferential transfer 
statue does little to redistribute assets.  Its limited scope is likely why courts 
have read the fraudulent transfer statutes so broadly202 and, as discussed in 
this Note, it unfairly penalizes investors who act in actual good faith.203 
C.  Trustee Discretion:  Increased Uncertainty and Prolonged Litigation 
The trustee is given great discretion in deciding which clawback 
claims to pursue,204 which injects a subjective element into the application 
of the law and is likely to lead to prolonged litigation.205  For example, the 
                                                                                                                 
 201. Id. at 871 (citations omitted). 
 202. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text (explaining that the abrogation of 
the good faith defense treats fraudulent transfers like preferential transfers). 
 203. See Part V.A (discussing the consequences of the narrowing good faith defense). 
 204. See Barasch & Chestnut, supra note 64, at 926 ("The trustee or receiver in a Ponzi 
scheme has a fair amount of discretion in whether to pursue claims against investors and 
other transferees."). 
 205. See Alain Leibman, Revisiting Madoff and His Stakeholders—Is Trustee Picard 
Pursuing Hadassah and Other Charities as Candidates for "Clawback"?—Installment 32, 
WHITE COLLAR DEFENSE AND COMPLIANCE, Fox Rothschild LLP (Aug. 2, 2010), 
http://whitecollarcrime.foxrothschild.com/2010/08/articles/bernard-madoff/revisiting-
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trustee in Madoff’s bankruptcy, Irving Picard, has said that he will not seek 
the return of funds from "net losers,"206 and he will not file lawsuits against 
"net winners"207 who are financially destitute.  He "recognizes that many 
people are not going to be in a position to pay anything back."208  As a 
result, a hardship program has been implemented.209  Picard assesses 
whether investors, who would otherwise be subject to avoidance actions, 
qualify for hardship based on factors including inability to pay for 
necessary living expenses (including loss of home to foreclosure), 
necessary medical expenses, or the care of dependents.210  "Declaring 
personal bankruptcy . . . [or o]therwise suffering from extreme financial 
hardship as demonstrated by other circumstances" are also grounds for 
hardship exception.211  Although it seems patently unfair to force those with 
limited means to pay back funds, it essentially means that wealthy investors 
are the only parties targeted, simply because they are in a position to pay.  
Prudent investors who saved the money that they withdrew can "afford" to 
return those funds and are forced to do so, while those who spent the money 
lavishly can claim hardship.  This promotes irresponsible spending over 
saving and disfavors generally wealthier investors with the financial 
stability to return what they withdrew.  Although there is some sense of 
fairness in the notion of only forcing those to pay who are able to do so, the 
law should at least attempt to treat all parties similarly, and an exception 
that promotes poor financial management should be against public policy. 
                                                                                                                 
madoff-and-his-stakeholders-is-trustee-picard-pursuing-hadassah-and-other-charities-as-
candidates-for-clawback-installment-32/#page=1 (last visited Aug. 9, 2011) ("[T]he criteria 
that Mr. Picard will use to separate those from whom he will seek clawback and those . . . 
from whom he will not raise fundamental questions of fairness, size[,] and relative value that 
will likely lead to much more controversy and potential litigation.") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 206. See Assessing the Limitations of the Securities Investor Protection Act:  Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored 
Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) (testimony of John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School), 
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/Media/file/hearings/111/Coffee092310.pdf 
(defining net losers as investors who withdrew less than the amount of their principal).   
 207. See id. (explaining that net winners are investors who withdrew their principal and 
any fictitious profits).   
 208. Untangling Madoff’s "Winners" And Losers, supra note 187. 
 209. See Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC Liquidation Proceeding, 
Hardship Program, http://www.madofftrustee.com/HardshipProgram.aspx (last visited Aug. 
9, 2011) (outlining the hardship program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
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Instead of filing lawsuits against all people who withdrew more than 
their principal, Picard’s lawsuits are being filed primarily against those who 
he deems "should have known," which incidentally coincides with deeper 
pockets.212  This sentiment of perceived unfairness is well-reflected by the 
statements of Fred Wilpon and Saul Katz, owners of the New York Mets, 
who were recently sued for $1 billion,213 $300 million of which reflects 
profits and $700 million of which is principal withdrawn over the years.214  
The men allege that the claims against them are "abusive, unfair[,] and 
untrue," and that the lawsuit is nothing more than "an outrageous strong-
arm effort to try to force a settlement by threatening to ruin our reputations 
and businesses."215  "[T]he lawsuit seeks to hold them responsible for the 
indirect benefits they derived from the apparent success of their many 
investments in Mr. Madoff’s firm, which allowed them to flourish in other 
areas, including buying the Mets."216  In the words of one Wall Street 
Journal columnist:  
The Wilpon-Katzes are accused of taking out $300 million in "fictitious 
profits," but the family is also worth much more than that, which makes 
them irresistible targets for the fatal "or"—they knew or should have 
known that Madoff was a fraud.  Hence the Picard lawsuit’s demand of 
an additional $700 million in principal the family had withdrawn over 
the years.217 
Picard’s aggressive stance towards the Mets’ owners must be contrasted 
with his approach toward some charities.  Cognizant that many charities 
"are struggling with materially reduced contributions because of the 
economy, increased demands by individuals who are unemployed and 
suffering financially, losses in endowment funds from the substantial 
                                                                                                                 
 212. Untangling Madoff’s "Winners" And Losers, supra note 187. 
 213. Bob Van Voris, Madoff Trustee May Do What Bernie Didn’t:  Give Victims Profit, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 11, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-
11/madoff-trustee-may-do-something-bernie-never-did-give-victims-real-profit.html (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 214. Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Madoff and the Mets:  How the "Extremely Wealthy" 
Allowed the Madoff Fraud to Endure, WALL ST. J. (BUSINESS WORLD) (Feb. 8, 2011, 9:12 
PM) http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704364004576132201926195 
130.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 215. Voris, supra note 213. 
 216. Peter J. Henning, Mets Owners Face Novel Claim in Madoff Clawback, N.Y. 
TIMES (DEALBOOK) (Feb. 7, 2011, 2:49 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/mets-
owners-face-novel-claim-in-madoff-clawback/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2011) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 217. Jenkins, supra note 214. 
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market declines and increased regulatory activity," he has taken a less 
aggressive approach towards such organizations.218  For example, 
Hadassah, a Jewish charitable organization, was allowed to voluntarily 
settle by repaying $45 million, even though it faced a potential clawback 
claim, for fictional profits alone, of $97 million.219  This is approximately a 
mere 58% of the fictitious profits.220  It is worth noting that "Hadassah had 
sophisticated investment advisers over the period of their Madoff 
investments," so the disparity in treatment cannot be based on level of 
financial acumen.221  "While the [more lenient] position . . . by Picard as to 
charities may be humanitarian and emotionally appealing, there is little 
basis in the law for the disparity in treatment between charities and for-
profit entities."222  By evaluating the relative worth of investors, and 
subjectively determining the amount for which the party should be held 
accountable, Picard exacerbates the uncertainty in terms of prospective 
liability and makes investors more likely to feel they were treated unfairly 
and seek judicial review.223 
Predictably, the suggestion that Picard’s disparate treatment will lead 
to litigation has already proven true.224  Wilpon and Katz succeeded in 
having the lawsuit against them moved from federal bankruptcy court to 
                                                                                                                 
 218. Alain Leibman, The Madoff Profit Game:  Will the Mets End up Losers Off the 
Field While Charity Stakeholders Become Winners?—Installment 17, WHITE COLLAR 
DEFENSE AND COMPLIANCE, Fox Rothschild LLP (Oct. 26, 2009), http://white 
collarcrime.foxrothschild.com/2009/10/articles/bernard-madoff/the-madoff-profit-game-
will-the-mets-end-up-losers-off-the-field-while-charity-stakeholders-become-winners-in 
stallment-17/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 219. Alain Leibman, Picard Chases Madoff "Winners" in Inconsistent Fashion—
Contrasting Treatment of the Wilpon Family Versus Hadassah—Installment 45, LEXOLOGY 
(Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7201f843-bf8b-4d32-9778-
229177a03431 (last visited Aug. 9, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 220. Michael J. Kline, Picard Crusades Against the Wilpon/Katz Family Charitable 
Foundations While He Moves to Settle with Hadassah, LEXOLOGY (Feb. 21, 2011), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4d9400eb-8be7-46a8-8a44-461456cd12ec 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2011) ("Picard is willing to settle for approximately 58% of the 
Fictitious Profits reported for Hadassah, presumably because they may be a worthier 
charitable vehicle in his eyes than the [charities of Wilpon and Katz].") (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 221. Leibman, Picard Chases Madoff "Winners" in Inconsistent Fashion, supra note 
219.  
 222. Id. 
 223. See id. ("This inequality of approach will more likely than not lead to protracted 
litigation and uncertainty in the Madoff matter."). 
 224. See, e.g., Picard v. Katz, 11-cv-03605, 2011 WL 4448638 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 
2011).   
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district court.225  On September 27, 2011, U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff 
dismissed nine of the eleven claims against the Mets owners.226  Rakoff 
found that Picard could only maintain claims under federal bankruptcy law 
and could not take advantage of the longer time period provided under state 
law.227  The main claim remaining alleges actual fraud under Bankruptcy 
Code § 548(a)(1)(a).228  This limits the financial exposure of Wilpon and 
Katz to withdrawals made within two years of the bankruptcy filing by 
Madoff’s firm.229  Judge Rakoff noted that Picard could not recover 
withdrawals of principal made within the two years preceding the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition under § 548(c) "absent bad faith."230  Significantly, 
Rakoff rejected the "inquiry notice" approach taken by the Bayou court in 
determining "good faith" under § 548(c).231  Instead, in the "context of a 
SIPA trusteeship," Rakoff found that scienter was required to prove a lack 
of good faith:  Only "‘willful blindness’ to the truth is tantamount to a lack 
of good faith."232  Rakoff elaborates: 
The difference between the inquiry notice approach and the willful 
blindness approach is essentially the difference between an objective 
standard and a subjective standard. . . . 
A securities investor has no inherent duty to inquire about his 
stockbroker, and SIPA creates no such duty.  If an investor, nonetheless, 
intentionally chooses to blind himself to the "red flags" that suggest a 
high probability of fraud, his "willful blindness" to the truth is 
tantamount to a lack of good faith.  But if, simply confronted with 
suspicious circumstances, he fails to launch an investigation of his 
broker’s internal practices—and how could he do so anyway?—his lack 
of due diligence cannot be equated with a lack of good faith, at least so 
                                                                                                                 
 225. Richard Sandomir, Ruling Limits Financial Exposure of Mets’ Owners, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2011, at B11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/sports/ 
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far as section 548(c) is concerned as applied in the context of a SIPA 
trusteeship.233 
However, Rakoff’s ruling is tempered by a footnote in which he states:  
"[T]he Court does not resolve on this motion whether the Trustee can avoid 
as profits only what defendants received in excess of their investment 
during the two year look back period specified by Section 548 or instead 
the excess they received over the course of their investment with 
Madoff."234  While the decision purports to clarify the bounds of Picard’s 
reach, it does not provide the clarity necessary to facilitate out of court 
settlements.  Additionally, Picard has already filed an appeal.235 
In the Madoff liquidation, mediation is mandatory for all parties 
against whom an avoidance action is brought.236  If Picard seeks $20 
million or less, he will pay for the mediation expenses, but for all claims 
over $20 million, the expense falls on the investor.237  If individual 
investors disagree with Picard’s assessment, the investor does have the 
option to proceed to court instead of settling with the trustee.  However, in 
the words of Steve Harbeck, the president of SIPC, Picard "has the 
resources to conduct a serious and intense legal campaign."238  The investor 
must also keep in mind that the trustee is appointed by the presiding judge.  
"As a result, you’ll get a fair hearing, but it will be subjectively biased in 
favor of the trustee [and m]ost bankruptcy judges tend to be as pro-trustee 
as federal judges tend to be pro-prosecutor . . . ."239  Moreover, the party 
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must cover its own litigation costs, which can be substantial.240  The party 
would also have its finances publicly vetted.241 
In terms of recapturing the greatest amount of assets from the fewest 
number of individuals, an approach of targeting wealthier individuals 
makes sense.  However, it unfairly penalizes wealthier parties, who are 
forced to pay back considerably more than just the "fictitious profits" 
withdrawn during the reachback period in order to avoid a costly and 
reputation-damaging trial.242  Even the SEC has "argued that it would be 
inequitable to pursue disgorgement of principal payments from a select few 
investors when there are hundreds—maybe even thousands—of investors 
who have received principal payments yet are not being sued or are beyond 
the court’s jurisdiction."243 
Picard’s largest settlement of $7.2 billion, which notably is "the largest 
single forfeiture in American judicial history," came from the estate of 
Jeffery Picower.244  His estate agreed to repay not just the $2.4 billion 
withdrawn within the six-year reachback period, but the entire $7.2 billion 
withdrawn by "Picower, his charitable foundation[,] and related entities . . . 
over 20 years."245  This decision was presumably made to avoid a lifetime 
of litigation.246 
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Picard has also taken advantage of the possibility of treble damages or 
putative damages.  Picard has filed a lawsuit against JPMorgan Chase 
seeking approximately $1 billion in bank profits and an additional $5.4 
billion in damages.247  He is also seeking $9 billion from HSBC, a London-
based financial institution,248 and $2 billion from USB AG, a Swiss bank.249  
He has "sued Bank Medici AG and its founder, Sonja Kohn, as well as 
Bank Austria, UniCredit SpA and [additional] parties . . . seeking $19.6 
billion from them, which could triple to $58.8 billion under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)."250  Given the 
substantial claims already filed against financial institutions,251 even 
Madoff has commented that Picard is pursuing individual investors too 
aggressively.252  While some of Picard’s claims have been dismissed for 
lack of standing he has filed a notice of appeal.253 
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However, some bankruptcy trustees are even more aggressive than 
Picard.  Doug Kelley, the trustee who is overseeing the bankruptcy of 
convicted Ponzi schemer Thomas Petters, has asserted that the reachback 
period applicable to clawbacks is "suspended by reason of the schemer’s 
concealment of the fraudulent Ponzi scheme."254  This would allow Kelley 
to recoup not only the profits and principal withdrawn in the last six years, 
but every withdrawal ever made since the inception of the Ponzi scheme.255  
He has stated that he will "reach back for money from the start of the Ponzi 
scheme, more than a decade ago."256  Although Kelley’s theory of 
concealment remains untested in the courts,257 it evidences the lack of 
predictability facing investors.  In Kelley’s own words, "[w]e are making 
law day by day."258  The bankruptcy judge handling the Petters case has 
reserved ruling on the statute of limitations issue.259  Because investors are 
unable to calculate how much they may be liable for, it will presumably 
make mediation less successful, or force them to settle because they fear the 
aggressive stance that the trustee will pursue in court and cannot predict the 
court’s ruling due to the lack of coherent case law.   
VI.  Proposed Solutions to Promote Predictability in Asset Distribution 
Post-Bankruptcy 
Given the broad discretion afforded to bankruptcy trustees in pursuing 
clawback claims selectively and the wide latitude of the bankruptcy or 
district court to craft remedies as it deems fit, the asset distribution plan in 
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essentially all bankruptcy cases likely does comport with law.  However, 
that does not prevent litigation, mean that the results were reached in a 
principled manner, or suggest that equitable principles actually prevailed.  
Moving forward, there are several options to promote predictability in 
situations where Ponzi schemes enter bankruptcy.  The proposals range 
from legislative action to contractual measures, and from preventing 
clawbacks to substantially increasing their reach, but either extreme would 
introduce much-needed consistency into the law. 
A.  Proposed Legislation 
New Jersey Representative Scott Garrett has introduced legislation to 
prevent the trustee representing Madoff’s victims from pursuing additional 
clawback claims.260  Garrett introduced a similar bill last session, and he 
believes that ordinary investors who were unaware of the fraud should not 
have to forfeit any portion of profits that were recorded on their monthly 
statements:  "I introduced this legislation because I am increasingly 
concerned that the trustee in the Madoff case is ignoring the law and failing 
to provide prompt assistance to those who have been thrust into financial 
chaos."261  Garrett’s bill would protect investors who withdrew fictitious 
profits in good faith.262 
New York Representative Gary Ackerman has introduced similar 
legislation to prevent trustees from clawing back money from investors in 
Ponzi schemes.263  Ackerman’s proposal was offered in conjunction with 
several other members of the House Financial Services Committee, and it 
limits clawbacks to being filed only against those who were "complicit or 
negligent in their participation in the Ponzi scheme."264  It also extends 
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$100,000 in SIPC protection to indirect investors who are currently 
excluded from coverage.265  A co-sponsor of the bill, Peter King, stated:  
"While [Congress] unfortunately cannot return the full amount of funds that 
were greedily stolen in these Ponzi schemes, this legislation will put in 
protections that will provide some financial relief to the victims, restrict 
clawbacks, and restore investor confidence in the market."266 
Both proposals protect good faith investors and are supported by 
compelling arguments, one of which is reliance:  Investors who withdrew 
money and enjoyed its use for as many as six years were doing so in 
reasonable reliance.  Moreover, financial investments always carry some 
risk, and those with funds still invested were presumably less risk-adverse 
or more willing to take a chance based on changing market conditions, or 
were at least better prepared for the shock of losing their investment.  
Ackerman’s bill would also help parties with pressing monetary needs.  
Although providing $100,000 of protection to all defrauded investors, even 
those who invested through a hedge fund, may be nominal to heftier 
investors, it would go a long way towards helping those who need 
immediate financial assistance.  However, neither proposal adequately 
protects investors against the narrowing of the good faith defense or sets 
forth a uniform approach by which trustees and courts must abide. 
B.  Congress Amending Preferential or Fraudulent Transfer Statutes 
As suggested in this Note, the good faith defense is construed narrowly 
to allow the court to treat fraudulent transfers as preferences.267  This allows 
avoidance of the transfers, and redistribution in a pro rata manner that the 
court deems more equitable.  There is nothing inherently wrong with this 
approach.  The problem resides in the fact that a narrowed good faith 
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defense is a misapplication of the current law as written,268 and inconsistent 
application of the law leads to uncertainty and disparate results.  Although 
courts have inherent equitable power, "a bankruptcy court may not use its 
equitable powers to ignore the specific dictates of a bankruptcy statute."269  
Specific to Ponzi schemes that enter bankruptcy, Congress can certainly 
amend the preferential transfer statute to cover a more expansive amount of 
time or amend the fraudulent transfer statutes to abrogate the good faith 
defense.  Uniform changes in the law need to be promulgated from the 
legislative branch, as opposed to being derived by individual judges in 
discrete cases.270 
C.  Contractual Measures in Investment Contracts 
An interesting proposal by one group of commentators basically 
replicates the contractual corporate compensation clawback idea in the 
Dodd-Frank Act and applies it to investment contracts.271  Instead of relying 
on courts to avoid transfers "at the back end—a remedy whose reach . . . is 
generally limited" to no recovery by the statute of limitations and to only 
profits by operation of the good faith defense, "the investor could in theory 
better protect herself prospectively by including a provision in the 
investment contract that would claw[]back all amounts paid out to investors 
contingent on the fund becoming insolvent as a result of the fraud."272  Such 
a provision would have the effect of treating all transfers as preferential:  
No matter when the transfer was made, the entire amount—principal and 
fictitious profits—would be returned.  It would operate like a rule of strict 
liability, as there would be no good faith defense.  This proposal would 
treat all investors similarly because exact pro rata distribution would be 
possible.273  The authors also suggest that such a provision would better 
reflect the expectations of investors: 
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Such a risk distribution arguably reflects more accurately what the 
reasonable investor would have expected in the first instance, but which 
expectation turns out to be false and can be restored post facto only to a 
limited extent.  Clawbacks in investment contracts therefore operate to 
ensure that investors’ expectations concerning risk allocation are not 
shortchanged.274 
There are potential problems with this proposal, a major one being the 
lack of contractual privity between investors.275  The typical investment 
structure consists of individual contracts between the individual investor 
and the investment operator or fund.276  Investors would be wary of signing 
a clawback agreement under which they would be bound "to surrender all 
funds received without the assurance other investors would do the same."277  
Essentially, such a provision would benefit co-investors while possibly 
serving to the detriment of the individual investor.278  One way to overcome 
such a shortcoming is through a requirement of reciprocity: "[O]nly 
investors with similar provisions in their investment contracts would be 
permitted to enforce the clawback."279  The authors also suggest that such 
terms might become standard in investment contracts over time because the 
risk is reallocated among investors while having no impact on the 
investment firm’s liability.280 
There is a strong public policy argument in favor of such contractual 
provisions.  As the law currently stands, an investor has no incentive to 
discover a fraud, at least not until he recoups his principal (and possibly 
waits for the expiration of the reachback period to ensure he cannot be 
disgorged of his withdrawals).281  "[B]ecause an investor subject to a 
contractual clawback will generally stand to recover more the earlier the 
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fraud is discovered, the incentive structure is reversed in favor of disclosure 
at the earliest possible time."282 
D.  Amalgamated Proposal 
Courts should uniformly utilize tracing principles when it is feasible to 
do so and only turn to pro rata distribution when tracing is not viable.  As 
noted by the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, pro 
rata distribution should only occur when tracing is impossible.283  Given the 
recent trend of courts allowing pro rata distribution, despite the ability of 
claimants to trace individually,284 either Congress or the Supreme Court 
needs to mandate a return to traditional principles.  Although the 
Restatement views these cases as anomalies,285 it is hard to imagine that 
subsequent courts would not follow their precedent, especially given the 
confusion surrounding restitutionary principles.286  The idea that tracing is 
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appropriate whenever it is practicable needs to be reiterated before more courts 
break with tradition and order pro rata distribution.  As the Supreme Court 
stated in Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance Co.:287  "The Bankruptcy Act simply 
does not authorize a trustee to distribute other people’s property among a 
bankrupt’s creditors."288 
Congress should clarify that the good faith standard in the Bankruptcy 
Code is subjective289 and that fraudulent transfers should not be treated as 
preferential transfers.  Just as courts often disregard tracing in favor of ratable 
distribution, courts also construe the good faith defense narrowly because it 
allows more transfers to be avoided and a resulting higher corpus to be 
distributed pro rata.290  If Congress reaffirms a subjective standard, which 
would protect the principal of those who withdrew funds in actual good faith, 
extending the reachback period to cover the entire length of the Ponzi scheme 
becomes less problematic.  Extending the reachback period would allow all 
profits received over the course of the Ponzi scheme to be avoided and 
redistributed from the estate on a pro rata basis.  Only investors who knowingly 
participated or acquiesced in the fraud would be subject to returning all 
withdrawals—principal and profits—made over the course of the fraud.  The 
modern push is towards achieving at least a rough parity between early and late 
investors, so extending the reachback period helps effectuate this goal. 
If the reachback period is extended, the traditional equitable defense of 
"change in position" should be recognized:  "If receipt of a benefit has led an 
innocent recipient to change position in such manner that an obligation to make 
restitution of the original benefit would be inequitable to the recipient, the 
recipient’s liability in restitution is to that extent reduced."291  This defense 
would function like the hardship defense by protecting early investors who are 
not in a position to repay the withdrawn funds.  However, change in position 
would be applicable to all investors, not just those who are financially destitute.  
Even wealthy investors could benefit from the defense if they were able to 
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prove that they used the withdrawn proceeds to fund an endowment or make 
charitable donations that they would not have otherwise made.292 
If Congress extended the reachback period, reaffirmed that the good faith 
defense has a subjective standard, and recognized "changed circumstances" as 
a defense, the courts could reach all of the "phantom profits" while still 
protecting individual investors from excessive clawbacks that include their 
principal (so long as they acted in good faith).  Only investors with actual 
knowledge of the fraud would be penalized with having to return withdrawn 
principal as well as profits.  Such an approach balances the interests of early 
and late investors and mitigates the prejudice currently bestowed on wealthier 
or savvier investors. 
Congress should also enact a provision protecting the investment of 
whistleblowers in order to encourage diligence on the part of investors and 
encourage earlier discovery of fraudulent schemes.  Currently, the avoidance 
laws discourage investors from investigating the investment fund because if the 
investor finds it is fraudulent, he is subject to having his withdrawals reclaimed.  
"[T]he law is certainly a powerful disincentive to discovering ex post facto that 
you’ve invested in a Ponzi scheme, for reasons that the [current clawback] 
lawsuit[s] make[] obvious."293  A possible solution would be to enact a 
whistleblower provision that allows the discovering investor to recover his 
entire principal, or that specifically exempts such a party from clawback 
lawsuits.  This approach would presumably have minimal impact on the overall 
value of the estate and the recovery of the numerous other defrauded investors, 
but it would certainly provide a substantial incentive for the individual investor 
to reveal the fraud as soon as it is discovered.  Even if the amount set aside for 
the whistleblower is substantial, by revealing the scheme earlier, the erring 
fiduciary will have dissipated fewer assets, which should more than offset any 
decrease in the corpus of the estate.   
By limiting pro rata distribution to situations when tracing is impossible, 
traditional property and restitution rules will not be contravened.294  A 
                                                                                                                 
 292. See id. § 65 cmt. c (explaining the defense of change in position).  The 
Restatement comment states: 
[T]he fact that the recipient has spent the money is not of itself a defense to 
liability in restitution, because an expenditure of funds—without more—does 
not constitute a change of position. . . .  [T]he recipient must demonstrate a 
causal relationship between receipt and expenditure:  in other words, that the 
expenditure is one that would not have been made but for the payment or 
transfer for which the claimant seeks restitution. 
Id. 
 293. Jenkins, supra note 214. 
 294. See supra notes 284–72 (discussing that pro rata distribution in cases where 
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subjective good faith defense protects all investors equally and makes an 
extension of the reachback period to encompass the entire Ponzi scheme 
reasonable because only parties with actual knowledge are forced to repay 
principal in addition to fictitious profits.  Although the principal of innocent 
investors certainly should be protected (especially since they are likely to 
reasonably rely on funds that they have held possibly for decades), there is no 
comparable argument for parties who knowingly participated in a fraud.  
Finally, a whistleblower provision would transform the current disincentive of 
discovering fraudulent schemes into a powerful incentive for investors to vet 
funds and brokers before investing, remain diligent throughout the duration of 
their investment, and follow up on all "red flags." 
VII.  Conclusion 
As noted by multiple commentators, the financial culture which allowed 
Madoff to flourish "largely remains in place today."295  Given that Picard has 
already collected about half of the deficit, Madoff suggests that the "net losers" 
of his scheme are arguably in a better position than the investors who otherwise 
lost money in the 2008 financial decline.296  Regardless of the relative recovery 
amount, it is apparent that the SEC is unequipped to catch fraud and is likely 
facing budget cuts that will only further hurt its efficiency.297  Unless changes 
are made, "the fact remains that the time couldn’t be riper for the next 
                                                                                                                 
tracing is feasible is not supported by developed law). 
 295. Frank Rich, Op-Ed., At Last, Bernie Madoff Gives Back, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 
2011, at WK8, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/opinion/13rich.html.  
 296. Steve Fishman, The Madoff Tapes, N.Y. MAG., Mar. 7, 2011, at 93, available at 
http://nymag.com/news/features/berniemadoff-2011-3/ (quoting a phone interview with 
Bernie Madoff).  It is interesting to note that Madoff’s victims might actually recover more 
than individuals invested in the stock market who sold at a loss.  Madoff points out that the 
recovery is already at "50 cents on the dollar" and that many investors "probably would’ve 
lost all that money in the market" anyway.  Id.  Madoff may be correct.  The S&P 500, 
which tracks the stock movement of the NYSE and NASDAQ, and is considered a 
bellweather for the U.S. economy, "lost about 56% of its value from the October 2007 peak 
to the March 2009 trough."  Kiran Manda, Stock Market Volatility During the 2008 
Financial Crisis, STERN SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, Apr. 1, 2010, at 2, available at 
http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/glucksman/docs/Manda2010.pdf. 
 297. See Sarah N. Lynch, SEC Watchdog Tells of Waste but Is Cautious of Budget Cuts, 
WESTLAW NEWS & INSIGHT (Feb. 10, 2011), http://westlawnews.thomson.com/National_ 
Litigation/News/2011/02_-_February/SEC_watchdog_tells_of_waste_but_is_cautious_of_ 
budget_cuts/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2011) ("Many Republicans unhappy with key provisions in 
the Dodd-Frank financial reform law have said they might try to keep the [SEC] from 
implementing them by starving its budget.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
WHEN THE BEZZLE BURSTS 1641 
Madoff . . . to get in the game."298  While we might be unable to predict or 
prevent the next Madoff,299 we can at least have a consistent framework for 
working out restitution questions afterwards. 
In the aftermath of a failed Ponzi scheme, some investors will inevitably 
be shortchanged.  There is no easy answer when the losses resulting from fraud 
exceed the amount available for restitution.  However, there is too much 
variance in the current law due to the discretion afforded to the court presiding 
over the distribution as well as to the trustee charged with recovering assets.  
Courts are given too much leeway in deciding whether to employ tracing or 
order pro rata distribution.  The Reporter’s Notes to the Restatement note that 
"the diminished familiarity of some courts with traditional equity techniques 
appears to have fostered a basic misconception:  that the property rights of 
fraud victims may either be recognized or disregarded as a court may elect, to 
achieve a result the court views as desirable in a particular case."300  By treating 
fraudulent transfers as preferences, the abrogation of the good faith defense has 
led to pro rata distribution in situations where it might not be justified.  The 
lack of certainty leads to expensive, time-consuming litigation and delays the 
recovery of defrauded investors.  The current concept of what is "equitable" 
burdens wealthy investors more heavily in that they are more likely to be 
targeted by the trustee, are ineligible for the hardship exception, must cover 
mediation costs, and are less likely to prevail under a good faith defense.  
Clarification of the law has the potential to streamline the recovery process, cut 
costs, and restore the equitable principles underlying the Bankruptcy Code.  
The newly published Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment 
is hopefully a good start in bringing clarity into an unwieldy area of the law,301 
and further action by Congress can help achieve parity between Ponzi scheme 
victims while protecting innocent investors and promoting the early discovery 
of fraudulent schemes. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 298. Rich, supra note 295. 
 299. See Cramer & Pilmer, supra note 36, at 28 ("[E]ven though all Ponzi schemes are 
certain to fail from their inception, it is just as certain that future schemers will devise new 
frauds and find new victims, if only until those frauds inevitably collapse."). 
 300. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 59 reporter’s 
note (g) (2011). 
 301. See Rendleman, supra note 48, at 943 ("Progress and a better quality of justice for 
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